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Abstract 
  As noted by research journalists, ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius (1997), foreign 
policy decisions “…are shaped in relatively small groups and informal face-to-face 
interaction” (p 4).  This study explores the influence of small groups on the 
effectiveness of decision-making techniques and examines how to counter the new 
forms of groupthink such as an inner-circle of influence.   
  This project utilizes an experimental design study to test the relative 
efficiency of two decision-making models in a pre-scripted scenario in countering this 
new inner-circle form of groupthink.  Using a cross-over research design, participants 
responded to each scenario with random assignment into one of two decision-making 
models: the Delphi model and an iterative feedback technique referred to in this paper 
as the Continuous Group Problem Solving (CGPS) model. After completing two 
decision-making scenarios, participants identified the most effective decision-making 
model overall and potential for this method to counter dominance by an inner-circle of 
influence. 
  The results from this study are significant since the findings reconceptualize 
the term groupthink as a simpler term implying inner-circle influence that preempts 
thorough decision-making.  The findings also provide insight for future application in 
countering the deleterious control of an “inner-circle.”  These exploratory research 
results are ripe for replication in large corporate or Government organizations, The 
desire to have a voice in the decision process and to overcome inner-circle influence 
will be of value to those conducting future research.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 As individuals, we often consider several potential options before making a 
decision.  Individuals weigh the benefits and sacrifices of various options that could be 
realized by implementing their preferred course of action and then decide which to 
select.  The duration of the decision-making process may vary dependent on the 
importance of the decision outcome to the individual.  The individual must assign 
weights to each option and re-evaluate information against new considerations for each 
alternative before making a decision.  The more time an individual has to make the 
decision, the more time there is to gather information sufficient for a thorough and 
informed decision to be made based on facts available.   
 Much the same is true when collective decisions are made by a group.  The group 
members must find and evaluate alternatives, assign weights based on benefits or 
sacrifices, and comparatively evaluate the alternatives prior to making the final decision 
(Beebe & Masterson, 2003; Yukl, 2002).  However, there are additional interpersonal 
dynamics to consider in a group decision process such as reinforcement of the 
individual’s position (or the taking-of-sides), and actions by a small group of colleagues 
serving as an inner-circle (ibid.).  This research is focused on identifying actions of a 
subgroup, or an inner-circle, to manipulate a group decision not fully supported by all 
members.  The results may also provide recommendations for countering inner-circle 
influence during the decision-making process. 
 Contemporary scholars claim organizations rely on perceived interpersonal 
synergy to support effective group decision-making (Beebe & Masterson, 2003; Yukl, 
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2002; Deutsch & Coleman, 2000).  Groups are known to have more relevant knowledge 
and ideas than individuals, and this knowledge and ideas can be pooled to improve 
decision quality.  Active participation within the group will increase member 
understanding of decisions and member commitment when implementing the decision 
(ibid.).  Groups may encounter problems reaching a final decision based on consensus, 
especially when one or a few members dominate the process or fail to compromise, or 
worse, fail to participate.  This is one reason individuals often seek out a subgroup 
within the main group; a group were members have similar interests and are more 
likely to reach consensus within the subgroup.  Group members may also join an inner-
circle of members who have similar perceptions of the outcome intended by leadership 
of the organization or the decision-making group.  Thus, this in-group of people with 
similar interests or objectives takes the form of an inner-circle.  While the inner-circle 
allows consensus it may also stop short of thoroughly reviewing alternatives if a 
premature consensus is reached (ibid.).   
 In 1997, ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius noted that:  
 “As the eminent political psychologist Philip Tetlock and his associates 
(Person, McGuier, Change, and Feld) have argued, ‘Most political decisions in 
the workplace today are the product of a collective decision-making process’.  
One can make a strong prima facie case that how this group decision-making 
process unfolds plays a crucial role in determining the fate of (organizations)…” 
(p. 123).   
 
As organizational leaders depend more on the use of groups for information, advice and 
decision making, the fate of the organization is at risk as assumptions may be left 
unchallenged and the views of dissenters cast aside if consensus is reached prematurely 
(Beebe & Masterson, 2003; Deutsch & Coleman, 2000; Jablin & Putnam, 2000).   
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 Janis first proposed the classical concept of groupthink in 1972, later updating the 
concept to acknowledge the rational decision process (Janis, 1982).  His updated 
concept of groupthink includes these shortcomings; incomplete problem definition, 
incomplete development of solution alternatives, and a lack of review and analysis prior 
to group consensus seeking (ibid.).  Premature consensus or concurrence seeking group 
members performing in highly visible or stressful situations was identified by Janis as 
the reason groups did not thoroughly evaluate the decision to be made.  “While 
unfashionable among mainstream social psychologists during most of his career, Janis’ 
position helped to lay a foundation for the exciting wave of research into social 
cognition… since the early 1980s.  Like Janis, much of this more recent work 
acknowledges the importance of emotionally charged ‘hot’ cognition so common in 
real-world decision making…” (‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 2007, p. 36).  As 
acknowledged by Janis (1982), emotionally charged situations can drive incomplete 
analysis of the decision criteria and solutions as typical in individual decision-making 
and thus are not necessarily a sign of groupthink.  In 1982, Janis modified and updated 
his groupthink model to focus on concurrence-seeking leading to premature consensus.  
More recently, action by an inner-circle to influence a decision and pushing for 
unanimity or premature consensus is identified by Van Assche (2008) and today’s 
media as the new definition of groupthink. 
 Janis’ theory of 1982, attributes groupthink to collective avoidance, escalation, 
and collective optimism (Van Assche, 2008; ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 1997).  Group 
member optimism, either by a subgroup or by all, is the attribute ‘t Hart, Stern & 
Sundelius identified as the key element behind groupthink when no pressure is evident 
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as called for by Janis in his groundbreaking theory of groupthink.  Collective optimism 
and avoidance were labeled as neo-groupthink by ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius in their 
book, Beyond Groupthink (1997).  Van Assche (2008) identifies collective optimism, 
unanimity, and the desire to avoid doubt as key issues behind an inner-circle of 
influence within the Bush administration decision to enter the Iraq War.  In recognizing 
this inner-circle of influence as a form of groupthink, the Senate Intelligence 
Committee has endorsed this new definition of groupthink (ibid.) and effectively 
removed the label of neo-groupthink proposed by ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius.  Social 
and public media have further endorsed the new definition of groupthink as decisions 
made by, or heavily influenced by, an inner-circle (BBC News, 2012; CNN, 2012; 
Dougherty, 2012).  The cause and effect of groupthink proposed by Janis, and the new 
inner-circle of influence variation of groupthink, will be explored in addition to 
methods to counter inner-circle influence will be analyzed further in the literature 
review. 
 Ultimately, this research seeks to answer the questions: How extensive is the 
inner-circle of influence phenomenon, commonly recognized as groupthink, in 
decision-making?  And, how effective are two decision-making models in countering 
this influence?  The qualitative results of this research are exploratory pilot study and 
ripe for an expanded replication with quantitative analysis. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 To fully understand the workings of groupthink and the decision-making process, 
one needs to know the context in which Janis derived his definition of groupthink and 
then understand the subsequent research over the last 30 years.  Research trends 
between the world wars evolved from organizational level theories of the individual, 
the role of the individual in groups, group cohesion, and group problem solving and 
decision-making.  These theories were later revised between 1950 and the late 1970’s 
to form new organizational theories used by Janis (1982) to revise and enlarge his 
concept of concurrence seeking as groupthink.   
 In this chapter the literature on the decision-making process is reviewed to 
determine first; the continuing relevance of Janis’ groupthink model with subsequent 
research, and the new “inner-circle” known as groupthink, and second; to identify 
decision-making techniques that enable a small decision group to overcome the 
problems commonly associated with the inner-circle of influence labeled as the new 
groupthink phenomenon.  The goal is to identify the circumstances that lead to 
groupthink and to identify potential strategies to counter it effectively as it occurs.  This 
research will be valuable to those organizations dependent upon small groups for 
strategic decision making. 
The Decision Process 
 Philosophers and historians alike ponder what past decisions say about our values 
and how we decide to allocate resources.  Research has focused on methods, such as 
risk management analysis, to improve the decision-making process and obtain a 
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desirable outcome.  Tradition and research have taught us to use constraints in making 
the best decisions possible.  
  “Sometime in the midst of the last century, Chester Barnard, a retired 
telephone executive and researcher of The Functions of the Executive, imported 
the term ‘decision making’ from the lexicon of public administration into the 
business world. There it began to replace narrower descriptors such as ‘resource 
allocation’ and ‘policy making.’ 
 The introduction of that phrase changed how managers thought about what 
they did and spurred a new crispness of action and desire for conclusiveness… 
‘Policy making could go on and on endlessly, and there are always resources to be 
allocated…’Decision’ implies the end of deliberation and the beginning of 
action.” (Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006, p.33).   
 
As we try to employ the latest technology and gather all pertinent facts surrounding the 
decision to be rendered, only limitations on time and the availability of information 
prevent us from making rational decisions (ibid.). 
 Decision processes or models are typically cognitive or normative in perspective 
(McDermott, 2006).  The cognitive process adapts to the parameters and changes 
thereto during the decision-making.  A normative process applies a rational and logical 
analysis of alternative choices to make the best informed decision.  These two 
approaches are often combined lead one to a cognitive process following a logical order 
of analytical steps to evaluate and weigh the alternatives to identify the best decision.  
The end result is the rational model commonly used today (ibid.). 
Nominal & Rational Methods 
 The nominal method, or nominal group technique (NGT), is ideal for making a 
quick decision to avoid the endless discussions mentioned by Buchanan and O’Connell 
(2006).  The NGT method as originally proposed by Delbecq and Vande Ven (1971), 
calls for group members to present their solution along with an explanation.  Solutions 
are grouped by like kind based on common parameters, and then rank ordered to 
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identify the solution considered best.  NGT offers diversity of thought with the 
potential for combining ideas into a new solution alternative.  The availability of 
synergistic solutions can lead to improved decision-making (Beebe & Masterson, 2003; 
Deutsch & Coleman 2000; Gustafson, Shukla, Delbecq, &Walster, 1974).  The solution 
identified with the best ranking score then becomes the final decision.  The standard 
procedure to reach final decision includes these five steps: 
 
1.  Introduction of purpose and procedure of the group meeting, such as resolution 
of a hot, emotional issue or one of significant importance. 
2. A reasonably short period of silent generation of ideas with no discussion 
among group members.  This step enables those who think well without 
disturbance to have quiet time.  It also avoids undue influence by the most vocal 
members. 
3. Sharing ideas and explanation behind the group member proposed solutions. 
4. “Neutral” group discussion of details and intent for a common understanding of 
each solution proposed.   
5. Rank ordering to identify the solution that best meets original purpose.  Either 
by a vote or point scoring system for each solution.  The meeting concludes 
with a known outcome shared with each participant.  (NGT, 2010) 
 
The NGT technique featuring silent brainstorming (and silent brain writing to generate 
a maximum number of alternatives), when compared to techniques calling for 
interactive groups is thought to produce more creative ideas and stimulate balanced 
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participation by group members.  Group members may gain greater satisfaction and a 
sense of pride of ownership (Delbecq & Vande Ven, 1971).  For decisions requiring 
extensive discussion and analysis, the nominal approach can be expanded if time is 
available to allow a rational exchange of ideas between interactive group members 
(ibid.). 
 Rationality applied in a decision process is based on the realist's rational actor 
model wherein one acts in a logical and ethical manner.  An alternative, “instrumental 
rationality” is rational only if one accepts the leader's goals regardless of intent 
(Damerow, 2010).  Over time, a rational decision process resulted in the interactive 
rational decision-making model, figure 2-1.  The model follows a logical and orderly 
path from problem definition through generation of alternatives, evaluation, and a final 
decision (McDermott, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 2-1:  Rational Decision-Making Model 
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 The first step is defining the exact problem which may not be obvious to the 
group making the decision.  Leadership must provide some guidance to assist in 
defining the problem and the desired outcome (ibid.).  Once the group members agree 
upon the problem definition, it becomes possible for the group members to effectively 
generate alternative solutions.  
 The second step requires group identification of evaluation criteria to measure the 
potential outcomes (success or failure), of a given alternative solution.  An initial 
evaluation of alternatives may lead to generation of new alternatives and a second 
evaluation prior to final assessment of the alternatives to be considered.  Upon reaching 
final assessments of alternatives, the group is then ready to decide on the best 
alternative.  These steps conclude the basic rational process.  There are multiple 
versions of this model based on 7, 8 or even a 9-step process, most if not all, contain 
these basic steps above (ibid.).  Additional steps added to the basic process include; 
implementing the decision, monitoring the outcome over time, generating feedback on 
effectiveness of the decision, followed by a review of the basic steps of problem 
definition leading to selection of an alternative to identify possible improvements that 
could lead to a new or better solution and implementation (ibid.). 
 Limitations of time, available information, effective evaluation criteria, the 
participant’s cognitive abilities, and political restraints, have detracted from the 
popularity of the rational decision-making model (McDermott, n.d.; Usry 2004).  It is 
argued today that the model is still valuable if the political aspect is omitted.   
 In an attempt to resolve some of the shortfalls in the rational decision model, in 
the early 1990s, the U.S. Army War College conducted a strategic leadership 
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conference to forecast future needs of leadership in leveraging information technology 
and real world factors within the rational model.  The workshop teams proposed use of 
the rational decision-making model combined with a “naturalistic approach” to offer 
leaders more flexibility for innovation while following the basic model (Shambach, 
1996).  The flexibility allows for intuitive and analytical methods to mix during the 
decision process.  They concluded that future leaders should be given the flexibility to 
expand the rational model to accommodate decentralized decision-making and virtual 
technology in an attempt to capture real world events and respond accordingly (ibid.).   
 Today, the U.S. military continues to use the rational MDMP as its primary 
decision tool.  As outlined in the Department of Army (DA) Field Manual (FM) 101-5, 
the MDMP consist of the following steps: 
Step1.  Receipt of Mission. 
Step 2.  Mission Analysis. 
Step 3.  Course of Action (COA) Development. 
Step 4.  COA Analysis. 
Step 5.  COA Comparison 
Step 6.  COA Approval. 
Step 7.  Orders Production (implementation guidance) 
 
To prepare for civil-military cooperation in emergency response situations, the military 
now uses “The Crisis Action Planning Model” (Shambach, 1996).  This model follows 
the sequential path outlined below: 
 Set Organizational Goals and Objectives 
 Develop Alternatives 
 Compare/evaluate alternatives using objective criteria and weights based 
 on the leader's guidance 
 Choose among alternatives the one that best matches the criteria 
 Implement the decision 
 Command, lead and manage 
 Feedback loop-observe results and begin process again as required 
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The Crisis Action Planning Model is based on the rational model and the use of synergy 
available through collaborative decision-making.  Leveraging the synergy that can 
occur through interaction, the model aids the group in applying critical thinking to 
overcome homogeneity, polarized cohesion, biases, and suppression of dissenting 
opinions (ibid.).  Note the final step in this model is the feedback loop for application of 
critical thinking called for by Van Assche (2008), Usry (2004), ‘t Hart, Stern & 
Sundelius (1997), and Janis (1982).  
Use of Expert Consultants 
 Janis responded to critics in 1982 by adding the option to use expert consultants 
during the decision-making process he recommended to prevent groupthink.  Previous 
to this addition by Janis, the Delphi model became a popular tool for policy making 
during the 1970’s.  The Delphi model evolved at the onset of the Cold War.  As 
developed by the U.S. Army Air Corps, the Delphi model employs a panel of experts to 
provide cognitive input for discussion by others as a form of creative synergy (Helmer 
& Dalky, 1999).  Several versions of the Delphi model were adapted for policy 
decisions and general decision-making dependent upon a group of subject matter 
experts (SME’s).  The Delphi model employs a multiple round of communication 
feedback to allow interactive decision-making in a virtual and democratic process with 
the group leader making the final recommendation or final decision based on the input 
of the SME’s.  The interaction provides a structured process to create “collective 
intelligence” (Hiltz & Turoff, 1978).   
 The Delphi structure is based on several key characteristics.  Characteristics 
include anonymity of participants and monitoring of regular feedback by a panel 
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facilitator or group leader (Rescher, 1998).  Contributions from the panel of experts are 
collected in response to a survey or questionnaire after consent to participate is 
arranged.  The facilitator moderates the interaction of participants by filtering out 
superfluous or irrelevant comments between rounds of discussion to avoid negative 
feedback often generated in face-to-face (FtF) discussions.  The director then filters 
comments received and initiates another round of input based review of the prior round 
of comments received.  The series of communication efforts is diagramed in figure 2-2 
(ibid.). 
 
 
Figure 2-2:  The Delphi Model Communication Structure  
 
 
A Michigan State University (MSU, 1994) extension group listed the following steps or 
rounds of panel discussion and feedback in order to: 
 
13 
 
1. Identify the problem 
2.  Develop alternatives 
3. Analyze and evaluate alternatives 
4. Explore background information leading to differing evaluations 
5. Seek new information  
6. Correlate informed judgments based on new evaluations 
7. Conclude with a summary or final outcome 
 
 
The MSU group confirmed these steps outlined above were similar to the nominal or 
rational group processes.  The intent of the multiple rounds of evaluations in Delphi 
model is to gain consensus through the iterative process (ibid.).   
 The Delphi model has been known to produce poor results in some cases and to 
be time consuming.  The success of the participants is dependent upon the depth of 
their knowledge and written skills.  To limit time impacts, repetition, or failed 
consensus due to lack of effective input, Murray Turoff (as described in Rescher, 1998) 
proposed the Delphi model be used in support of decisions by the group leader or those 
responsible for the final report.  The leader or facilitator is then responsible for bringing 
closure by determining a final outcome. 
Inner-Circle Decisions and Groupthink 
 As fallout from the corporate failures by Enron, Xerox, Tyco, Qwest, HealthSouth 
and several other firms, to protect stock holder interest, the terms groupthink and inner-
circles manipulation became synonymous with one another.  Inner-circle failures to 
remain objective and protect stockholder interest were blamed as the mechanism for 
groupthink to occur.  James Fanto (2003) in his research paper, “Whistleblowing and 
the Public Director: Countering Corporate Inner-Circles”, references several cases of 
corporate corruption labeled as groupthink where one or more inner-circles of decision-
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makers are identified as responsible for failure of the firm to serve stockholders 
responsively.  Fanto identified some cases where failure to uphold stockholder interest 
were directly related to inner-circle competition wherein on inner-circle “cooked the 
books” to appear more successful to gain reward over competing inner-circles or 
divisions within the organization.  Multiple references from media sources label this 
inner-circle culture of manipulation as groupthink.  By the late 1990s, the media had 
embraced this new label of groupthink and continue to refer to groupthink as failure by 
inner-circles of decision-making teams.   
 As evident in today’s media, the term groupthink has emerged as an indicator of 
failed decision-making by an inner-circle of confidants.  News stories such as the Bush 
administration decision to enter the Iraq war (Isikoff & Corn, 2012, Van Assche, 2008), 
and the ABC Nightline and Philadelphia Enquirer (Cohen & DeBendedet, 2012; 
Sheridan, 2012), coverage of Penn State university officials who discredited the 
university in their handling of the Jerry Sandusky scandal, continue to identify inner-
circles behind the scene accused of groupthink.  In President Bush’s case, the inner-
circle called themselves the “Vulcans” and consisted of many strong personalities to 
include the President, Vice President Chaney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, his 
deputy Paul Wolfowitz, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and Secretary of 
State Colin Powell (Van Assche, 2008).  The Vulcans are accused of high pressure 
tactics in persuading the security community into validating evidence supporting the 
need to intervene in Iraq to prevent use of weapons of mass destruction. 
 Additionally, as reported by CNN and BBC News, the ongoing Syrian conflict is 
credited in part to faulty decisions by Al-Assad’s inner circle (BBC News, 2012; CNN, 
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2012; Dougherty, 2012; Levs, 2012).  It appears members of the media are now focused 
on who is responsible for failed decision-making and often reference an inner-circle of 
influence is involved. 
 In his 1982 book on groupthink, Janis acknowledges the work of an inner-circle 
may be at hand in some of the political case studies he reviewed.  Janis claims at least 
two of the case studies (political decisions) include signs of an inner-circle directing the 
decision outcome without use of structured decision-making model.  Janis sites the 
inner-circle identified by Neville Chamberlain within his own War Cabinet as a driving 
force that failed to prevent the escalation of WWII.  He also believes the Bay of Pigs 
fiasco under the Kennedy administration is another example of an inner-circle failure to 
identify the best alternative.  This inner-circle was driven by Robert Kennedy and Dean 
Rusk whom other group members believed were acting on behalf of, and empowered 
by, the President.  The Kennedy inner-circle was identified as the group of “wise men” 
the President consulted during several political decision of his administration (‘t Hart, 
Stern & Sundelius, 1997).  Although these historical cases were acknowledged by ‘t 
Hart, Stern & Sundelius, they hypothesize polarization and other causes may in fact be 
the driving force in some of the historical fiascoes studied by Janis. 
 Deutsch and Coleman (2000) have found a cohesive subgroup of the team, acting 
as an inner-circle and empowered by the leader or empowered by the group hierarchy, 
may pressure and influence the team decision by avoiding critical thinking and seeking 
concurrence.  This pressure may take the form of dehumanizing or irrational actions 
toward those who do not concur.  This is consistent with much of the research and 
theory of the past 30 years indicating group decision-making is not consistently 
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structured in an orderly way with rational thought (ibid.).  Rather it is flawed by 
cognitive bias, group liability, group restraints, or organizational restrictions that limit 
the group’s ability to perform effectively (ibid.). 
 Ineffective group performance is the result of limited discussions and interaction.  
Janis (1982) claims the symptoms of defective decision-making will also be present in 
ineffective groups exhibiting symptoms of groupthink.  He believed the more often a 
group displays these symptoms; the worse will be the quality of its decisions, on the 
average (ibid.).  He acknowledged groupthink symptoms can be driven by concurrence-
seeking typical of a group pressing to meet a deadline, or as guided and manipulated 
toward premature closure by an inner-circle (ibid.). 
 Several research teams (Beebe & Masterson, 2003; Deutsch & Coleman, 2000; 
Jablin & Putnam, 2000; ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 1997), disagree with consensus-
seeking as being a key factor in groupthink and claim cohesion of the group can lead to 
a positive consensus effect or a rational decision.  The team of ‘t Hart, Stern & 
Sundelius refer to the 1981 research by Shaw as confirmation of cohesiveness as 
positive and desirable among group members.  The desirable effects are: improved 
member-to-member communication, increased member satisfaction, decreased member 
tension, and effective group task accomplishment (ibid.).  The use of situational 
leadership techniques with a focus on task and objectives for the decision group can 
increase cohesiveness and enhance the group’s problem solving ability.  The leader is 
responsible for providing the decision background and may recommend a rational 
model to the group.  The leader selects the appropriate model, Delphi etc, and identifies 
relevant factors associated with the decision (ibid.).  One note regarding the 
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effectiveness of face-to-face interaction (of nominal and rational methods) is the 
potential for reduced generation of alternative solutions and critical thinking during 
analysis of alternatives.  The face-to-face interaction also allows undue influence of 
inner-circle members.  The use of the Delphi technique to avoid face-to-face 
interaction, or to gain insights from a panel of experts, can lose the face-to-face 
communication richness and trust among members as the group leader has directional 
authority over discussion of alternatives.  Although directional leadership can be 
constructive for identifying the problem, undue directional influence by the leader is 
countered by the new model proposed below. 
General Group Problem Solving Counters Groupthink 
 In effective decision-making models, the group acknowledges its goals, objectives 
and task to perform (brainstorming, analysis & evaluation, etc.) in making the decision.  
The decision will be dependent on having good options or good alternatives.  The group 
may then draw a conclusion or make a recommendation for implementing the decision 
it has made (Beebe & Masterson, 2003; Deutsch & Coleman, 2000; ‘t Hart, Stern, & 
Sundelius, 1997).  As claimed by ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius (1997), a model of high-
level policy decision-making was missing until 1983 when Aldag & Fuller proposed 
the General Group Problem Solving (GGPS) model as comprehensive enough to 
account for all the missing factors.  They claim the GGPS model is a decision tool that 
can be used for any decision-making challenge, at any level.  A variation of the GGPS 
is proposed by ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius to counter this shortcoming and the input 
from an overbearing or directional leader (shown below).   
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 The GGPS model includes the five main phases: problem recognition, 
development of alternatives (solutions), evaluation and selection of the best alternative, 
implementation of solution, and decision control.  Fuller and Aldag explain that all of 
Janis’ groupthink factors are addressed and countered in these five phases (ibid.).  For 
example, Janis’ groupthink defects can be categorized by the following phases: 
 
1. Incomplete survey of each objective is a failure during the problem 
recognition phase. 
2. Incomplete survey of each alternative solution is a failure during development 
of alternatives. 
3. Failure to examine risk of preferred alternative is a failure during the 
evaluation and selection of the best alternative. 
 
 To counter the potential for groupthink, leadership bias, or bias in the form of 
inner-circle influence, ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius propose a variation to the Aldag & 
Fuller model for inclusion of a continuous feedback process to the GGPS model.  This 
would be similar to the recommendation for a second chance review of the final 
decision as proposed by Janis in 1982, but goes further by applying the continuous 
feedback in all steps of the process.  The researcher refers to the modified GGPS model 
as a Continuous Group Problem Solving, or CGPS, model.  The CGPS model includes 
a feedback loop as shown in figure 2-3 to allow for quality improvement in; generation 
of alternatives, decision quality, implementation, and satisfaction of the leader and 
group members (ibid.).   
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 The modified Aldag & Fuller model also presents all characteristics of the 
decision process in neutral terms.  Neutrality is further enhanced when, and if, an 
anonymous feedback process is included by the leader.  Finally, the model adds 
political influence factors and a measure of proactive actions by the group for 
consideration in feedback.   
 The addition of multiple feedback opportunities provides for dynamic interaction 
throughout the CGPS model.  Thus, the model is more successful than most in applying 
critical thinking and identifying bias (‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 1997), and may be a 
good tool for countering inner-circle influence.  The basic GGPS model proposed by 
Aldag and Fuller is modified as shown in figure 2-3 by addition of the feedback loop at 
the bottom indicating feedback reviews for each step of the process, to include a final 
review of all steps before making a final decision.  The continuous feedback loop is 
proposed by ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius as a tool for capturing real world changes and 
developments as new information is presented during the decision process.  Van Assche 
(2008) claims the potential for constant negative feedback, or a shocking contradiction 
of group perceptions (such as the 1968 Tet offensive in the Viet Nam War), are the two 
factors evident in case studies effective in changing concurrence or unanimity of 
thought.  The constant feedback, or wide-eyed reality of a shocking turn of events, was 
found to be effective in bringing negative feedback to the forefront for resolution.  Case 
studies reviewed by Van Assche indicated negative feedback was easily overlooked 
without a mechanism to constantly reintroduce the feedback.  Perhaps constant negative 
feedback together with smaller perception changes (not the shock factor Van Assche 
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describes), would also be effective in changing group perspectives and decision 
outcomes. 
 
 
         Dynamic Continuous  Feedback Loop 
Figure 2-3:  Modified Fuller and Aldag GGPS model (CGPS) 
(From Wikipedia w/addition of the dynamic continuous feedback loop) 
 
The Groupthink Phenomenon 
 Irving L. Janis is credited with coining the phrase “groupthink” in 1972 and in his 
book by this title issued in 1982, he states acknowledges both groups and individuals 
have similar shortcomings, yet the group can bring out the best in a person or the worst.  
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Janis continues to explain “groupthink” as an easily understood term to describe a way 
of thinking for people when they become a part of a cohesive in-group with the desire 
for harmony and closure leading to premature consensus.  Premature consensus 
(closure) is reached through inadequate formulation of alternatives or a limited 
perspective regarding the number of acceptable alternatives (ibid.).  This lack of critical 
thinking together with high cohesiveness among group members are the central features 
identified by Janis in updating his definition of groupthink.   
 The in-group may also be a subgroup or inner-circle within a larger group.  Janis 
later refers to groupthink in the following terms. 
 
 “I use the term ‘groupthink’ as a quick and easy way to refer to a mode 
of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-
group, when the member’s striving for unanimity override their motivation to 
realistically appraise alternative courses of action.  ‘Groupthink’ is a term of the 
same order as the words in the newspeak vocabulary George Orwell presents in 
his dismaying 1984 – a vocabulary with terms such as “doublethink” and 
“crimethink.”  By putting groupthink with those Orwellian words, I realize that 
groupthink takes on an invidious connotation.  The invidiousness is intentional: 
Groupthink refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and 
moral judgment that results from in-group pressures.  (Janis, 1982, p. 9) 
 
 
Janis develops his groupthink theory based on cause and effect of observable group 
symptoms found in case studies in crisis situations.  Janis initially identified eight 
symptoms of groupthink in 1972 (ibid.).  Later, after agreeing that many of these 
symptoms were in fact basic causes of poor decision-making (and lack of a structured 
decision methodology such as the rational model), Janis subdivided the symptoms into 
three main types below (ibid.).   
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Type I: Overestimations of the group – its power and morality 
 
1. An illusion of invulnerability, shared by most or all the members, which creates 
excessive optimism and encourages taking extreme risks. 
 
2. An unquestioned belief in the group’s inherent morality, inclining the members to 
ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decisions. 
 
 
Type II: Closed-mindedness 
 
3. Collective efforts to rationalize in order to discount warnings or other information 
that might lead the members to reconsider their assumptions before they recommit 
themselves to their past policy decisions. 
 
4. Stereotyped views of enemy leaders as too evil to warrant genuine attempts to 
negotiate, or as too weak and stupid to counter whatever risky attempts are made 
to defeat their purposes. 
 
 
Type III: Pressures toward uniformity 
 
5. Self-censorship of deviations from the apparent group consensus, reflecting each 
member’s inclination to minimize to himself the importance of his doubts and 
counterarguments. 
 
6. A shared illusion of unanimity concerning judgments conforming to the majority 
view (partly resulting from self-censorship of deviations, augmented by the false 
assumption that silence means consent). 
 
7. Direct pressure on any member who expresses strong arguments against any of 
the group’s stereotypes, illusions, or commitments, making clear that this type of 
dissent is contrary to what is expected of all loyal members. 
 
8. The emergence of self-appointed mindguards – members who protect the group 
from adverse information that might shatter their shared complacency about the 
effectiveness and morality of their decisions. 
 (Janis, 1982, p. 174) 
 
 Type III symptoms are common of the in-group unanimity.  A subgroup within 
the decision team, an inner-circle of high-esteem colleagues, may be more prone to 
display all three types of symptoms listed above, in part or in whole, while using 
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pressure on group members to conform to the inner-circle goals and objectives.  Janis 
(1982) explains this is the case in the Chamberlain WWII decision and the Pay of Pigs 
fiasco as discussed previously.  He also refers to research by others such as Baruch 
Fischhoff who responded to Janis’ theory by cautioning readers to consider that people 
consistently overestimate the predictability of past events using 20-20 hindsight once 
they know how events unfolded (ibid.).   
Causes of Groupthink and Inner-Circle Influence 
 Janis is quick to point out that nobody is perfect and to err is human.  In our 
efforts to seek coherence and support from others we let ourselves develop chronic 
blind spots in our logic (Janis, 1982).  The inner-circle is also subject to blind spots 
when they refuse to accept input from other members of the group or outside expert 
opinions.  Janis notes the blind spots occur as a disturbance in the individual’s behavior 
in decision-making due to temporary states of elation, fear, or anger thus reducing 
mental efficiency (ibid.).  Of course, some blind spots can evolve from the personality 
and personal experiences of the individual and therefore not a product of groupthink.  
The limited mental efficiency mentioned above is also attributed to groupthink by ‘t 
Hart, Stern & Sundelius (1997).  Deutsch & Coleman (2000), and ‘t Hart, Stern & 
Sundelius (1997), acknowledge reduced mental efficiency is generated by deadlines or 
other pressures for closure.   
 Cohesiveness is identified as a problem by Usry (2004), ‘t Hart, Stern & 
Sundelius (1997), and Janis (1982), when it leads to members becoming too close and 
too sensitive to each other’s feelings.  This can result in members agreeing too quickly 
on a solution without a thorough and objective review of the problem.  This can also 
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lead to fear of rejection by fellow members if one speaks out against a majority (or 
inner-circle) during decision-making.  As a result, critical analysis of the problem is 
avoided and creativity is limited (Usry, 2004; ‘t Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 1997; 
Shambach, 1996).  The main detraction or risk involved with groupthink is 
concurrence-seeking which leads to overconfidence and possibly a feeling of being 
bullet-proof or invincible (Janis, 1982).  The group may overestimate their chances of 
success and take on too much risk.  Often the illusion of moral superiority goes with the 
bullet-proof mentality.  This may lead the in-group (or inner-circle), into decisions that 
the individual members would consider as immoral or unethical when making their 
own decisions (Yukl 2002; Janis, 1982).   
 In his updated philosophy on groupthink, Janis (1982) summarizes three 
conditions that must be present for groupthink to occur.  That is, these conditions are 
cause for group members to no longer remain objective, and cause groups to deviate 
from the rational decision model.  The three cultures occur under the following 
circumstances: 
 
1. Insulation of the policy-making group, which provides no opportunity for the 
members to obtain expert information and critical evaluation from others 
within the organization. 
 
2. Lack of a tradition of impartial leadership.  In the absence of appropriate 
leadership traditions, the leader of a policy-making group will find it all too 
easy to use his or her power and prestige to influence the members of the group 
to approve of the policy alternative he or she prefers instead of encouraging 
them to engage in open inquiry and critical evaluation 
 
3. Structural factors such as group processes or “norms” can provide 
shortcomings if methodical procedures for dealing with the decision-making 
tasks are not inclusive.   
 (Janis, 1982, p. 176) 
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Impartial or directive leadership, either by the leader or by the inner-circle, along with 
signs of high cohesion among team members are indicators that groupthink may occur.  
The inner-circle can use these conditions above to their advantage as they can more 
easily influence the decision of the other team members through group pressure (ibid.).  
Janis also found such concurrence-seeking tendencies probably are stronger when high 
cohesiveness is based primarily on the rewards of being in a pleasant “clubby” 
atmosphere or gaining prestige from being a member of an elite group (ibid.).  
Identifying Groupthink and the Inner-Circle of Influence 
 
 As mentioned previously by ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius (1997), and Janis (1982), 
groupthink has the potential to occur every time a cohesive group meets.  The following 
four questions were proposed by Janis as a structured approach in reviewing case 
studies to identify cohesive groups and the possibility of groupthink. 
 
1. Who made the… decisions?  Was it essentially the leader alone or did group 
members participate to a significant degree?  If the members participated, 
were they in a cohesive group? 
 
2. To what extent was the (decision) a result of defective decision-making 
procedures on the part of those who were responsible? 
 
3. Can symptoms of groupthink be discerned in the group’s deliberations?  (Do 
the prime symptoms pervade the planning discussion?) 
 
4. Were the conditions that foster the groupthink syndrome present?    
 (Janis, 1982, p. 14) 
 
 Even strong individuals with high self-esteem and low dependence can get caught 
up in groupthink, especially when defective decision-making promotes concurrence-
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seeking as pressure toward unanimity (ibid.).  Janis (1982) states, “even when some 
symptoms are absent, the others may be so pronounced that we can predict all the 
unfortunate consequences of groupthink” (p. 198).  Unfortunately, the symptoms may 
not be evident if the individual members do not exhibit concurrence seeking.   
 It is possible for an inner-circle to reach their goals without actively seeking 
concurrence.  The inner-circle may be able to operate undetected or in a way to 
reinforce other group members who favor the same outcomes desired by the inner-
circle (‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 1997).  As a result, false negative findings (the 
failure to recognize or know if a symptom occurred), is highly possible.  It is also 
possible for a false positive observation.  That is, the observer may recognize several of 
the symptoms yet concurrence seeking and groupthink may not have occurred (ibid.).   
Van Assche (2008) refers to findings of ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius, as well as findings 
of Esser, to conclude unanimity of group members (or within an inner-circle) may 
create blind spots and groupthink tendencies without the presence of high stress or 
concurrence-seeking called for by Janis as factors leading to groupthink. 
 No research to date has tested the concept proposed by Janis and there appears to 
be little or no support of the model in its entirety (‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 1997).  
Much of the past study of groupthink involves previous governmental policy decisions 
or studies involving student volunteers and may be problematic.  Use of students may 
provide good insights to problem-solving dilemmas and they are our organizational 
leaders of tomorrow, but they cannot fully grasp a decision-making exercise they are 
not trained to perform (ibid.).  Unfortunately, extreme situations involving political 
compromise and internal or external power struggles, and the workings of an inner-
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circle, are almost impossible to replicate for study.  Therefore, the original intent 
behind Janis’ theory, of cohesion as a necessary force, still has not been tested.  The 
fact that Janis extracted his model from a study of “hot” policy decisions, does not lend 
itself to fit everyday events or common situations that can be reproduced in the 
laboratory (ibid.).   
 The one consistent finding of past studies is the tendency for impartial and 
directional leadership to promote groupthink (ibid.).  A possible fallacy exist as failure 
to evaluate alternatives is one factor common to both poor decision-making and 
directional leadership, and although it may lead to a poor decision it does not always 
result in groupthink (ibid.).   
Group Dynamics & the Inner-Circle 
 The individual is often considered to be the ideal form of creativity.  Less conflict 
is involved in the decision-making process of the individual (Deutsch & Coleman, 
2000).  The individual’s decision process is based upon self-interest and gain.  It is this 
self-interest and desire for benefits that drive the individual to join a group or an inner-
circle (ibid.).  It is the group roles and norms that allow common objectives and goals 
to be achieved in a way satisfactory to both the group and individual.  Synergy is the 
result of multiple individuals who combine their creative processes for a better decision 
outcome (ibid.).  Beebe and Masterson (2003) describe high performing teams as 
having a strong sense of interpersonal commitment, team purpose, urgency of goals, 
and awareness of a team approach.  The inner-circle is sustained by this same level of 
commitment to the members of their in-group.  Directional leadership or strong 
subgroup members (such as an inner-circle of high status colleagues), may be able to 
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influence the group decision by exploiting the symptoms identified by Janis in his three 
types of groupthink described above (‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 1997).   
Group Awareness 
 There is a strong awareness of failure in the high performing team.  That is, the 
team culture is one of mutual concern for each other’s growth and wellbeing.  Research 
by Deutsch & Coleman (2000) indicates that individuals who embrace the group and 
support their goals are likely to put aside personal interest in favor of the group.  The 
individual’s focus and that of the group are centered on expectation of outcomes and 
the benefits to be gained by a decision.  That is, will the decision gain what the group 
intended and just how important is the perceived gain.  In contrast to individual 
motives, the culture of the inner-circle focuses on the need to overachieve even at the 
expense of the out-group members (ibid.). 
 Beebe and Masterson (2003) state the high performing group’s advantage over 
other groups is their common goals and objectives.  The inner-circle survives with 
common goals and objectives imparted by the leader or the members of the circle.  
Group members who are close to each other and believe their supervisor respects their 
decision-making ability, will contribute the most resources for the good of the 
organization (ibid.).  An inner-circle of high status members may combine their 
resources in an effort to influence the group decision.  If the opportunity presents itself, 
the individual will bond with the inner-circle to gain high status and influence (ibid.).   
 The individual will always focus on gain and not loss.  Individuals tend to be 
“loss-averse”, so much so that one will forego gain to avoid loss, and one will be more 
willing to make concessions that forgo gain rather than concessions that result in loss 
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(ibid.).  Stress can build as the individual weighs the gains against the losses.  Stress 
can reduce the ability of the individual to apply rationale during decision making.  If 
stress is low, or when a positive mood prevails, the individual will seek more risk when 
the chance of a successful outcome is high and conversely, less risk if the outcome is in 
doubt (ibid.).  The individual may counter the burden of pressure by simply adhering to 
the low risk (for blame) direction offered by the leader or the inner-circle.  If the 
individual opposes the inner-circle, a strategy to counter the inner-circle must be found 
by the individual or other members of the out-group (ibid.). 
Group Status 
 As the group becomes more effective, the individual is more directly influenced 
by the group’s attributes.  Thus, being a member of an effective group reinforces the 
members will to communication at a higher level (Jablin & Putnam, 2001).  The desire 
to reach a higher level of communication and the resulting influence is motivation for 
the individual to seek groups of high power and influence such as a dominant inner-
circle. 
 Continuing to examine self interest of the individual, Schultz found the 
individual’s need to belong centered on the ability of the individual to gain power and 
control of one’s self and others while sharing an emotional closeness not possible 
otherwise (Beebe & Masterson, 2003).  The individual satisfies the physiological need 
to belong as first identified by Abraham Maslow (ibid.).  The “we” tendency adopted 
by the group, as in “we versus them” (‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 1997).  This need 
further strengthens group cohesion under the “sociological concept of ‘primary group’” 
(Beebe & Masterson, 2003).  The theory of primary group being used to explain the 
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assurance found in strength in numbers such as a band of brothers in combat or an 
emergency response team.  Group membership provides the individual self-esteem and 
respect (ibid.).   
 An individual with high-status when joining a group is placed in a position of 
influence (ibid.).  Individuals with high-status can then unite with other high-status 
individuals, or close confidants, to form an inner-circle.  Groups often rely upon the 
advice of the high-status person and offer a greater share of the group’s reward to those 
of high status (ibid.).  A member with high status is in the best position to become the 
group leader, and their inner-circle is in the best position to guide and direct the group 
during a decision-making task.  Beebe and Masterson (2003) concluded the ability to 
influence decisions within the group is legitimate power held by the high-status 
members of the group.   
Group Performance 
 Today, workgroups and management teams are common in all organizations.  In 
most countries and the United States over the past sixty years, the workplace has 
evolved to a more participative environment based on working relationships and 
cohesiveness (Van Assche, 2008; Jablin & Putnam, 2001).  Control by senior staff has 
relaxed in favor of participation of supporting staff members who form a collaborative 
relationship within work teams.  This trend is attributed to increased competition on a 
global scale, productivity demands, and union acceptance toward a more democratic 
work place (ibid.).  Collaborative work groups are becoming the standard in the 
workplace.   
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 However, when a high-status member of the group (member of the inner-circle) 
favors a decision alternative not endorsed by the remainder of the group, the group 
faces a negotiation process to reach a final decision (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000).  As 
negotiation progresses, it is usually the low-status group or low-power members who 
are more likely to initiate a win-win solution and the high-power group is less likely to 
do so (ibid.).  Subsequently, the low-power members have the onus of proposing a 
decision to maximize the interest of most group members.  Reaching consensus on the 
decision will require the members to overcome the egocentric interpretations of fairness 
described by Thompson and Lowenstein in their research (ibid.). 
 Beebe and Masterson (2003) found the predictability of group actions produces a 
trust among members that helps them to get past conflicts and individual interest in 
order to perform at a high level.  Jablin and Putnam (2000) acknowledge the 
willingness of management to invest the resources necessary, and to offer structured 
decision processes with the expectation of “reciprocity”, that is, leadership then expects 
the group members to perform at a higher level and in the best interest of the 
organization.  
 Deutsch & Coleman (2000) and Jablin & Putnam (2000) agree a mature group 
can perform at a higher level if the group communication rules (norms) for working 
together includes participation and sharing of knowledge.  The group culture must 
allow and encourage communication of critical thinking necessary to overcome 
pressure from the inner-circle, or pressure for premature consensus, to achieve the 
group’s objectives.  The group can then take advantage of all the brains in the group 
(ibid).  Beebe & Masterson (2003) explain a group culture in support of communication 
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will encourage members to act on information (thereby influencing the group), focus on 
goals, adhere to behavior allowed (avoiding behavior not allowed), and embrace 
cohesiveness among members.  The variables combine to form the group competence 
needed to succeed in problem solving, making decisions, and managing conflict (ibid.). 
 The positive group culture described above enhances cooperation and group 
synergy through unity of effort thereby enabling the group to be more productive than 
the individual (Beebe & Masterson, 2003; Deutsch & Coleman, 2000; Jablin & Putnam, 
2000; ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 1997).  The group performs a more complete and 
superior evaluation of information at hand by filtering out faulty data during an 
“information-triage” review and assessment.  Advantages inherent within the group are 
improved communication, the collective sum of information, discriminative & 
evaluative listening, the ability to stimulate creativity, better recall, satisfaction in 
participation, reduced stress, and increased self awareness (ibid.).  These findings 
indicate the individual works harder when part of a collective.  Additionally, ‘t Hart, 
Stern & Sundelius (1997) reference research by Fuller, Aldag & Moorhead, indicating 
the group culture may limit the influence of cohesiveness and lessen its potential for 
premature consensus during the decision process.  As a result, situational leadership 
with a focus on task and objectives may keep cohesiveness positive and enhance the 
group’s problem solving ability (ibid.).  However, the findings are not all positive.  The 
problems of group dynamics mentioned above may result in peer pressure on members 
to conform to the group, domination of discussions by one member, reliance on other 
members to get the work done (loafing), and the additional time required for a group to 
work through a decision (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000; ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 1997), 
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all of which may enable the inner-circle to pressure the group toward premature 
consensus.  When time is limited, it may be to the group’s advantage to delegate the 
decision to a subject-matter-expert, from within the group or brought in from external 
resources (Beebe & Masterson, 2003; Janis, 1982).  
Group Decision Process 
 Based on research of the past thirty years, the purpose of group decision-making 
is to reach agreement after full consideration of well understood alternatives and 
deciding on the option that has the most realistic potential for achieving the group’s 
objectives (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000).  High-quality decision-making relies on each 
alternative receiving a fair and open minded critique of strengths and weaknesses.  As 
an example, reference is made to Martin Luther King Jr. and his letter from 
Birmingham Jail wherein King asked us to challenge each other’s reasoning and logic 
concerning when civil disobedience is constructive or not (ibid.).  Deutsch & Coleman 
(2000) and Jablin & Putnam (2004) state a structured decision process involving critical 
thinking is required for better, high level, decision-making. 
Diversity of Talents 
 As found in most work groups today, cultural and racially diverse groups rely on 
a range of talents and experiences in bringing multiple perspectives to problem solving 
(Beebe & Masterson, 2003; Deutsch & Coleman, 2000).  The addition of multiple 
perspectives stimulates a creative conflict during the evaluation of the problem and 
decision alternatives.  Although diverse groups may have more challenges to overcome 
during the forming of a group culture, diverse groups can find common interest and 
goals upon which they can base their interaction and productivity.  Their diversity often 
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leads to more positive participation through flexibility, multiple perspectives, and by 
generation of multiple options based on the collective information at hand (ibid.).  The 
inner-circle will tolerate diversity of thought and outside sources provided the input is 
compatible with the goals and objectives of the inner-circle.  If not, the inner-circle will 
attempt to discredit the source (ibid.).  The latter is evident in the cabinet members of 
President Lincoln referred to as the most unusual cabinet in the history of the 
presidency.  President Lincoln included a broad variety of party members, republicans, 
whigs, democrats, and even challengers from within his own party for the nomination 
of presidential candidate.  Lincoln was confident in his own ability to facilitate this 
diverse group and make the best decisions with their input (Kearns Goodwin, 2005).  
From the Lincoln library (n.d.), he is quoted as saying, “We needed the strongest men 
of the party in the cabinet… these were the very strongest men… I had no right to 
deprive the country of their services.” 
 Comparison of diverse work groups to homogenous groups, reveals the diverse 
group as more productive than the homogenous one.  Jablin & Putnam (2001) make 
reference to research by Stohl indicating “the greater number of diverse groups from 
which a circle received relevant information, resources, and support, the more 
influential that group was in” ...selling their proposal to management.  The group then 
received the needed resources and buy-in from others in the organization to carry out 
the decision (ibid.).  
Creative Conflict 
 Study of conflict by Deutsch & Coleman (2000) reveals it to be a stimulant 
among group members.  Lack of conflict generally results in loss of creativity.  
35 
 
Therefore, creativity is dependent on the presence of conflict in one form or another 
(ibid.).  Conflict exposes the group members to multiple viewpoints and perspectives 
upon which they may construct alternative solutions.  In a related statement, Sir Isaac 
Newton said, “If I have seen farther, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants” (p. 
354).   
 When conflict is evident among cohesive group members they tend to pressure 
one-another to support the group cause.  The members unite to discriminate against the 
out-group thereby maintaining harmony within the group.  Harmony and cohesiveness 
are key factors enabling them to be effective and reach their objectives (Deutsch & 
Coleman, 2000).  As noted by Beebe and Masterson (2003), for the group to remain 
effective, small group size is generally accepted as less than 12 members.  Although 
research is not conclusive, it is generally agreed that groups larger than 12 reduce the 
level of interaction among group members to the point where the individual’s influence 
upon the group is diluted.  There is also the possibility that the larger the group, the 
more likely it will naturally subdivide into smaller groups that share common interest or 
similar goals thus diluting conflict levels and creativity (ibid.).  For groups to efficiently 
carry-out a rational decision model, the group size should be kept below 12 members. 
 Today the decision-making success of an organization lies more in its human 
capital and system capability than the physical assets.  Jablin & Putnam (2000) state 
human capability is limited to a small “scratch pad” of instant recall.  Use of outside 
subject matter experts, or SME’s, can leverage the group’s creativity and ability to 
perform critical analysis when following a structured rational process similar to the 
Delphi model.  Government and industry are leveraging their leaders and organizational 
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group decision-making abilities by use of a structured process, often taking advantage 
of external sources, in order to maximize effectiveness (Van Assche, 2008; Yukl, 2002; 
Jablin & Putnam, 2001). 
 For effective group decision-making, the organization must leverage the diversity 
in its human capital to raise creativity levels and stimulate multiple viewpoints in 
creating decision alternatives (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000).  The diversity inherent 
within the group provides more information and creativity for the generation and 
evaluation of alternatives.  Group members must share an awareness of potential 
pitfalls such as peer pressure to conform to avoid loss of critical thinking.  Small groups 
of twelve or fewer members are recommended for maintaining participation by all 
without the development of sub-groups or excessive peer pressure.  The small and 
diverse group is also capable of creating synergy needed to generating multiple 
perspectives and the collective information required for high quality decision-making 
(ibid.).   
Methods to Counter Groupthink 
 To combat the potential for inner-circle groupthink, the leader must focus the 
team on self evaluation and motivation in achieving objectives.  One technique useful 
for this purpose is the use of productive conflict, known as constructive conflict, to 
force analysis of opposing and divergent views (Beebe & Masterson, 2003).  If the 
team does not possess the ability to evaluate divergent views, the leader must provide 
the resources necessary to permit the team to be successful.  The resources provided by 
the leader can be an outside evaluator, or consultant, and a structured process to apply 
to the decision-making at hand (ibid.).  This is best accomplished by use of the 
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feedback loop and continual evaluation of the process as proposed by ‘t Hart, Stern & 
Sundelius (1997). 
Constructive Controversy Procedure 
 In addition to a structured process for decision making, constructive controversy 
is required for critical evaluation of the alternatives.  Research since the early eighties 
indicates constructive controversy is required for decision-making to be effective.  
Aristotle was a proponent of discussion to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of 
proposed alternative solutions with the intent to create a synergistic effect (Deutsch & 
Coleman, 2000).  Constructive controversy occurs when one members ideas, 
alternatives or opinions, contrast with those of another member during discussions.  For 
constructive controversy to be successful, the two members must seek to reach a 
consensus or agreement (ibid.).  This form of constructive controversy and consensus 
based upon the generation of alternatives is expected to have more positive outcome as 
opposed to the concurrence-seeking described by Janis (1982).  Campa, a professor at 
MSU, noted there are several assumptions underlying constructive controversy such as: 
having a common objective and a norm to accept proposals by all members of the 
group, accept their ideas, and accept evaluation of alternatives proposed by others (as 
described in Deutsch & Coleman, 2000).  To use this approach would require the 
assumed agreement to use skilled discussion of both sides during a critical evaluation, 
while respecting each other’s perspectives.  Openness and objectivity would counter the 
influence of the inner-circle (ibid.).  As previously noted, such cooperation by members 
must be a part of their group culture.  This form of cooperation is the basis for rational 
decision-making (ibid.). 
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 Constructive controversy leads groups to higher-quality decision where differing 
perspectives can be developed for consideration including ethical concerns.  The past 
thirty years of research have “(1) developed a theory of constructive controversy; (2) 
validated it through a program of research; (3) trained teachers, professors, 
administrators, managers, and executives…(globally) to field-test and implement the 
constructive controversy procedure; and (4) developed a series of curriculum units, 
academic lessons, and training exercises structures for controversies” (Deutsch & 
Coleman, 2000, p. 76).  Use of the constructive controversy in the rational decision 
model will avoid poor decision-making and inner-circle influence (ibid.).   
Strategic Leadership & Decision-Making 
 The capacity to manage human knowledge and to convert it into end products and 
services is becoming an essential leadership skill.  A leader needs to think in terms of 
system design and dynamics, or a systems perspective, to better leverage these abilities 
and expertise (Yukl, 2002).  The leader must find ways to enhance existing processes 
and identify when a new process is required to enable the organization to become 
successful.  This level of thinking is referred to as “systems thinking” (ibid.).  System 
or process execution is improved by setting intermediate as well as final goals and 
clearly articulating them to the group (Powell, Piccoli & Ives, 2004).  The impartial 
leader described here is proposed by Fanto (2003) as the solution to corporate 
manipulation by inner-circle groupthink associated with the Enron failure.  Fanto 
proposes independent Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) be appointed to oversee 
corporate decisions to provide goals and processes to counter self-interest of an inner-
circle or competing inner-circles. 
39 
 
 The leaders’ role is to provide structure and articulate the goals and objectives in a 
clearly understood frame of reference for the group (‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 1997).   
Leaders must frame a problem situation in a way that it is understood.  The leader must 
make sense of the situational facts related to the problem.  The leader must also provide 
frames of reference for conduct, professionalism, time management, and allowances for 
creativity necessary in brainstorming (ibid.).  Impartial leadership mentioned previously 
is most often ideal for establishing these frames of reference. 
 The ideal leader is described by most writers as a combination of directive and 
democratic leadership traits (Yukl, 2002).  Yukl claims the formal leader with a focus 
on task…, is overbearing and quality suffers (as the leader is too directive in nature).  
An overbearing leader also empowers an inner-circle directly or indirectly through 
common goals and objectives held by, or adopted by, the inner-circle (ibid.).  The 
group-centered relationship oriented leader (often democratic in nature) can serve as a 
facilitator and advisor and serves as a manager of the group.  As Yukl (2002) describes 
it:  
 “A leader’s personality and preferred leadership style often critically 
affect how the advisory group is structured, the roles of group members, the 
nature of debate and information processing within the group, and the quality of 
the decisions emerging from the group. ….leaders often set up the “rules of the 
game” regarding leader-adviser interactions…   …They reflect the leader’s work 
habits, the way he likes to receive information, the type of people he prefers to 
have around him, and the way he makes up his mind or takes decisions (p. 330). 
 
Perhaps Yukl’s thoughts on team leadership are best captured in figure 2-4 below, 
Hill’s model of team leadership recommended by Northouse (2004) to simplify the 
problem solving challenge for leadership.  The model is recommended for the leader, or 
40 
 
team member acting as leader, as a tool for determining when intervention is needed to 
stimulate or correct team decision-making .   
 
Figure 2-4:  Hill’s Model for Team Leadership (Leadership Theories, 2010) 
 
 Similar tendencies of leadership are summarized by ‘t Hart, Stern &Sundelius 
(1997), as the five dimensions of leadership orientation.  The first dimension is 
structure orientation or the desired degree of control over the group.  Second is the need 
for information management orientation in the form of structured rules, either for open 
debate with the leader as the hub, or formal analysis.  The third orientation is for 
information processing and the need for mind guards to accommodate openness to 
conflicting information.  Fourth, is the interpersonal orientation with a focus on social 
needs of others versus a task orientation.  The fifth is conflictual orientation or the 
41 
 
leader’s tolerance for creative conflict so vital to decision-making (p. 198).  In his 1982 
book, Janis acknowledges similar needs for leadership dimensions to provide structure, 
constructive conflict, outside expertise, and a second chance or final review of the 
decision to allow resolution of any remaining doubts.  To find the correct blend of 
Yukl’s orientations and the dimensions acknowledged by Janis, will require the leader 
to evaluate the situational needs of the decision-making group and provide the 
appropriate decision model and guidance.   
Review Summary 
 Review of literature clearly reveals groupthink as caused by concurrence-seeking 
alone is, “lacking empirical support and resting on generally unsupported 
assumptions… (indeed) perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the groupthink model is 
its continuing appeal in the face of nonconforming evidence” (‘t Hart, Stern, & 
Sundelius, 1997, p. 92).  The groupthink model has served a valuable role in bringing 
the group decision-making processes to the forefront of social and organizational 
research.  Over the years since Janis first proposed groupthink, various methods used to 
test for detection and prevention have proved to have moderate success at best (ibid.).   
 Today, we appear to have consensus among the press and within Congress to 
define groupthink as an inner-circle influence, or as an in-group acting as decision-
makers for the larger group (Van Assche, 2008; ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 1997; Janis, 
1982).  Methods to counter inner-circle influence were validated to include the 
structured approach found in the rational decision model.  The Delphi model, the CGPS 
model, and even the MDMP decision-making process all appear to be valid tools for 
countering groupthink yet none have been validated as effective in preventing inner-
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circle influence.  The one advantage the Delphi model may have is the anonymous 
nature of group members and the absence of face-to-face interaction (Rescher, 1998).  
The advantage offered by the modified GGPS, referred to here as the CGPS model, is 
the continuous feedback element within the decision-making model to enable detection 
of social biases, faulty analysis, and undue influence from leadership or an inner-circle 
of group members (‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 1997).  Face-to-face interaction offered 
by CGPS and MDMP provides the many benefits of; empathy, sincerity, non-verbal 
communication, and instant feedback.   
 To test the effectiveness of any one decision process to counter the inner-circle of 
influence requires selection of one or more of these rational models to test, then 
formulation of research questions to validate effectiveness.  For this research, the 
Delphi and CGPS models were selected for testing.  The research will focus on 
answering research questions using these methods as described in the next section. 
Research Questions 
 To determine the effectiveness of the Delphi and CGPS models in avoiding 
groupthink, a series of research questions were designed to identify specific traits and 
abilities in each of the models.  The research questions and a narrative explaining the 
intent of each question follows: 
 
1. Are research participants able to identify inner-circle influence, or directive 
influences, and will they identify this influence as groupthink? 
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 Participant validation of inner-circle influence as a new definition of 
groupthink is important to understand the public perception of groupthink 
today, and for use in future research. 
2.   Do participants view the Delphi and CGPS decision-making models as 
effective?  If yes, do participants recommend these models to counter the inner-
circle influence?  
 Validation of the Delphi and CGPS models and their ability to counter 
inner-circle influence is the main objective of this research.  Once validated 
here, these models can be put to use by industry and government alike.  
The models will likely be studied further dependent on the results of this 
experiment. 
3.   Which model, Delphi or the CGPS, or a non-researcher specified model, is 
preferred in countering directive members or inner-circle influence? 
 Participant selection of a preferred decision model for use to counter the 
inner-circle identifies the model most likely to be successful and aids the 
leader in selecting a model for this purpose.  This information is also 
pertinent to future research. 
4.   What are the respective strengths and weaknesses of the Delphi and CGPS 
models? 
 Identifying the strengths and weaknesses provides information regarding 
improvement of the model for future use or future research.  Strengths are 
also good indicators of the models ability to counter inner-circle influence. 
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5.   What is the utility of a feedback loop in identifying directive or inner-circle 
influence and countering its effect? 
 If not identified specifically as strength in the models, it is valuable to 
know if the use of feedback in the models is helpful, and if this feedback 
aids in countering inner-circle influence. 
6.   How can the preferred decision-making model be improved and can you 
identify a model you consider to be superior to the preferred model in this 
experiment? 
 Future research criteria and revisions to improve the decision models 
ability to counter the inner-circle are directly related to the models success.  
Future decision-making is dependent on improvements or use of new 
decision-making models recommended by the participants. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
Overview 
 The purpose of the research is to validate use of the Delphi and CGPS decision-
making models as effective tools for countering the influence of an inner-circle and to 
validate which model is most effective.  Research was conducted through an 
experimental design with random assignment that featured an intervention and post-test 
design consisting of a scenario for the first decision-making model (Delphi or CGPS), 
and a questionnaire to gather feedback data generated by participants.  This intervention 
and post-test was then repeated using the second decision-making model.  Then, after 
responding to the two scenarios, the participant completed an additional survey to 
compare the two decision models.  The research notation for this design is: R; X1 O1 X2 
O2 O3, where R indicates random assignment to a combination of one of two scenarios 
requiring one of the two different decision-making processes, X represents the 
intervention of the scenario and the decision-making technique and O represents the 
completion of the questionnaire survey related to the scenario. 
 The experiment included two scenarios, one asking the participant to make a 
decision using the Delphi (labeled DELPHI) and the other making a decision using the 
CGPS model (referred to as GGPS in the questions listed within the Scenario & 
Questionnaire section, plus Appendix B, and in the scenario transcripts of Appendices 
C & D).  Scenario strategy required the participants to read two transcripts of decision-
making meetings.  Scenarios considering public forums, corporate organizations, and 
county administrators, were considered for this experiment.  Due to the researchers 
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familiarity with military exercises at the combatant command level, it was decided the 
two transcripts shall each feature a different military setting: one is the withdrawal of 
U.S. military troops in Afghanistan (labeled AF or Afghan) and the other the 
collaborative construction of a medical facility (labeled HA for humanitarian 
assistance), in support of a military exercise.  Participants were provided background 
and environmental information such as time, place, setting and situational conditions 
impacting the decision.  A description of the decision teams in each scenario was also 
provided as background information.  Participants were provided the decision-making 
structure, setting, and leadership guidance recommended by Yukl (2002) and ‘t Hart, 
Stern & Sundelius (1997) in the previous strategic leadership discussion.  The 
participants were instructed to observe strengths and weaknesses of the decision models 
used in each scenario transcript.  The decision model was identified in background 
information.  The scenario scripts provided discussion points for decision alternatives 
and negotiations leading to the final decision.   
 As noted by Breen (2004) and ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius (1997), it is difficult to 
recreate the pressure situations and resulting concurrence-seeking environment 
described by Janis within a test exercise using students or other subjects.  It would be 
more difficult to create an experiment wherein participants would form an inner-circle 
of influence during a role playing exercise.  Past research by Janis (1982) is based on 
review of historical case studies.  The availability of case studies with inner-circle 
influence is subject to speculation.  For this reason, it was determined to use scripted 
scenarios to replicate decision-making dialogue involving several group members who 
acted as an inner-circle of influence.  Scripted scenarios simplify the participant role to 
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one of reviewer rather than active player in the exercise.  Each scenario contains 
elements of inner-circle influence and steps within the model to counter this influence.  
A questionnaire is employed to validate the internal validity and causality between the 
decision model (the independent variable, X) and resulting changes in the group’s 
ability (the dependent variable, Y) to overcome the inner-circle influence (CMU, n.d.).  
Questionnaire data and participant remarks are used to validate the effectiveness of the 
two decision models to counter inner-circle influence and determine if one model is 
superior to the other.   
Design & Methodology 
 The intent of each scenario is to provide a familiar setting for a military decision 
typical of those faced by joint forces (Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine), in order to 
evaluate the Delphi and CGPS decision-making models.  In the questionnaire, 
participants are asked to evaluate the communication openness, procedures, and the 
potential to overcome bias or high influence in the decision-making process.  Providing 
a familiar setting for the participants increases their comfort level and enables them to 
better understand scenario discussions and to focus on strengths, weaknesses, and 
communication effectiveness offered by each decision-making model (Koenig, n.d.).  
The final decision was not revealed as the participant was asked to speculate what the 
decision would be, why or why not they think this decision is appropriate, and how the 
decision process could have been improved to obtain a better decision outcome. 
 Participants read both the Delphi and CGPS scenario with the order of exposure 
being assigned randomly.  Each scenario describes the intent of the exercise, 
background information to include leadership guidance in the form of a commander’s 
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intent and mission statement, as well as the scenario script and the questionnaire.  The 
participants answer the same questionnaire immediately after reading each scenario.  
The questionnaire asks the participant to identify strengths and weaknesses and any 
undue influence by team members in the scenario.  The questionnaire is tailored to 
answer the research questions without leading participants or identifying a preferred 
decision-making model.  Participants are asked to reach their own conclusion as to the 
group decision and to identify influential group members involved.  The participant 
then selects the better decision-making model and justifies the selection. 
 Participants familiar with military settings typical of the scenario backgrounds 
provide feedback better suited for qualitative data analysis and verification of 
conclusions.  In lieu of providing an actual case study of inner-circle influence, or 
asking participants to engage in a role playing exercise, the scenarios offer the best 
alternative to a natural setting represented by a case study.  Without existing or known 
case studies involving the inner-circle influence, the scenarios serve as a quasi-
experimental basis for validation of the decision-making variables (Brogan, n.d.).  
Scenario & Questionnaire 
 Scenarios are drafted based on the researcher’s personal experience and 
familiarity with Department of Defense (DoD) projects for humanitarian assistance 
(HA) and the ongoing withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan (AF).  The 
Afghanistan scenario (Appendix C) requires a decision to withdraw U.S. forces quickly 
or over a prolonged period of time.  The HA scenario (Appendix D) involves the 
selection of a construction site for a clinic in a foreign nation hosting a military 
exercise.  The scenarios do not include any sensitive or classified information and all 
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background information was found in public news sources.  Each scenario includes the 
key steps for the decision model involved.  Key steps for each model are listed below 
with line numbers indicated where these steps were included in the two scenarios 
(Appendix C for AF and Appendix D for the HA scenario). 
1. Delphi  
a.  Assemble group of anonymous experts 
  (Line No’s:  AF 50-56;  HA 28-31; and 104-110 for AF and 98-106 for 
HA) 
b.  Develop questionnaire focused on identified problem 
  ( Line No’s:  AF 119-123;  HA 71-72) 
c.  Survey for comments and alternative solutions 
  (Line No’s:  AF 121-123, 123-147, 151-156;  HA 73-76, 119-139) 
d.  Process feedback  
  (Line No’s:  AF 148-160;  HA 139-144) 
e.  Distribute summary (common & conflicting views) for comment 
  (Line No’s:  AF 160-165;  HA 145-146) 
f. Participants evaluate their own forecasts & those of others, assess progress 
of group 
  (Line No’s:  AF167-196;  HA 146-176) 
g.  Process repeats itself until synthesis leads to agreement. 
  (Line No’s:  AF 196-228;  HA 177-214) 
h.  Final summary report issued to the group. 
(Rescher, 1998) 
 
2. General Group Problem Solving  
a.  Identify the Problem 
  (Line No’s:  AF 22-27 and 240-243 summary;  HA 3-11 and 221-230) 
b.  Generate Alternatives 
  (Line No’s:  AF 251-291;  HA 247 and 274) 
c.  Evaluation/Consult Experts & Choice 
  (Line No’s:  AF 292-324;  HA 231-232 and 280-317) 
d.  Anonymous Feedback 
  (Line No’s:  AF 327-356;  HA 357-373) 
e.  Final Discussion & Choice 
f.  Implementation 
g.  Control 
(‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 1997) 
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 In the experiment, the scenarios include all steps leading to the group decision 
i.e., for the CGPS model, steps “a” through “d” are included in the scenarios; and for 
the Delphi model, steps “a” through “g” are included in the scenarios.  Background 
information provides an overview of the decision model used in that particular scenario.  
A total of four scenario scripts are prepared.  Two scenario settings (HA project and the 
Afghanistan withdrawal) and two scenarios each for the Delphi and CGPS models were 
prepared to form a (2x2) crossover experiment design.  The participants read one HA 
scenario and one Afghan scenario written under the Delphi and CGPS models 
respectively.  To control for threats to internal validity caused by repeated exposure to 
the intervention and post-test, participants are divided into four groups alphabetically 
(A-F, G-N, O-S, and T-Z) to allow for random assignment in equal amounts to review 
scenarios in the four possible combinations below. 
 
 HA-DELPHI then AF-CGPS 
 HA-CGPS then AF-DELPHI 
 AF-DELPHI then HA-CGPS 
 AF-CGPS then HA-DELPHI 
 
Splitting the participants into four subgroups allowed for both Delphi and CGPS to be 
tested for each scenario, HA or the Afghan withdrawal, with equal numbers of 
participants reading each scenario.  The randomized distribution of participants 
strengthened internal validity and it was intended to provide an even number of 
comparisons of the four combinations above (CMU, n.d.).  The randomness further 
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contributes to the credibility of the decision-making model selected as best for 
countering inner-circle influence (ibid.).  Combined, these actions increased external 
validity and the possibility for generalization. 
 The HA scenario involves team members from several participating nations as an 
administrative committee.  The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) provides the team 
leader, a logistics division member of EUCOM.  The country representatives 
participating in the scenario are Romania (the host nation for the HA project), Bulgaria, 
Albania, Ukraine, Turkey, Greece, and Italy.  Each country representative and the 
EUCOM representative (except the Ukraine representative who is an advisor), is a 
voting member of the HA committee.  The scenario script includes an inner-circle of 
influence working behind the scenes together.  The country members comprising the 
inner-circle are the Romanian, Bulgarian, and Ukrainian representatives. 
 For the Afghanistan (or AF) scenario, the team members in the script are all U.S. 
Central Command (CENTCOM) representatives.  The team leader is the Division Chief 
(Ch.) of Planning.  The remaining members are the Ch. of Intelligence (Intel), the Ch. 
of Operations (Ops), the Ch. of Logistics (Log), the Ch. of Communications (Comm), 
the Ch. of Training (Trng), and the Ch. of Resources (Res).  The inner-circle of 
influence working together in the script is the Intel Chief, and the Ops Chief.  In the 
scenario script, the Log Chief plays the role of peace-maker and offers a compromise 
alternative.  The Trng Chief and Res Chief oppose recommendations of the inner-circle 
members.  No names of actual command representatives were used in either of the 
scenarios.  Names contained in the scenarios were created to reflect the HN of the 
representative or the position of the team member.  
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 Access to the experiment was granted to participants by use of an electronic 
hyperlink to the Qualtrics Research Suite automated web site.  The link was provided in 
an invitational email sent to candidates requesting their participation.  Electronic access 
allowed participants to review the questionnaire at their convenience in order to 
strengthen external validity and to encourage participation.  The questionnaire is 
divided into the three sections listed below. 
 
 Effectiveness of the decision model 
 Overall comparison of decision models 
 Demographic data 
 
 Participants answered the first set of questions after reading each of the two 
scenarios.  Participant responses identified the decision they think would be made, why 
that decision was made, any dominant or influential team members involved, plus 
strengths and weaknesses of the decision model.  The questions are included here with 
the research variable indicated for corresponding data analysis. 
 
1. What decision do you think was made (TSol) in this situation (which alternative 
did they select)? 
2. Why do you think that decision was made (YTSL)? 
3. What do you think the decision should be (which alternative do you think they 
should have picked, TSLP)? 
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4. If the alternative you select above is different from the alternative you think the 
team selected in the scenario, why is your selected alternative better (YTSLP)? 
   (If you selected the same alternative, enter "same") 
5. Excluding the group leader, who on the decision team had the most influence 
(Tinf) on the decision? 
6. What are the strengths of the decision techniques used in this scenario (DMps)?  
7. What are the weaknesses of the decision techniques used in this scenario 
(DMng)? 
 
 After reading the second scenario and answering the seven questions above a 
second time relative to the second scenario, the participant is directed to the following 
seven overview questions including a block at the end for entry of remarks.  The 
participants were asked to identify the most effective model for countering high 
influence team members (the inner-circle).  Participants were also asked to identify 
possible improvements to the models, and then explore any model recommended as 
superior by the participant based on past experience and familiarity.  Several of the 
questions are open-ended to allow comments and explanations by the participant.  The 
second set of questions and corresponding variables are included here. 
 
8. Thinking back on the two scenarios you read, which decision-making model (the 
GGPS technique, or the Delphi technique) do you think yielded the best decision 
(PpreDM)?  
9. Why did you select this decision-making process as the best (YPpre) technique used in 
the two scenarios? 
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10. Is it possible to improve the decision-making technique you selected as best (PImpr), 
and how would you do so? 
11. What is the decision-making method used by you and your colleagues (DMused)? 
12. Why do you and your colleagues favor this decision-making method (YuseDM)? 
13. Who in your organization is usually involved in decision-making (WhoDM)? 
14. If your organization were to start using the decision-making technique you selected as 
best, how would it improve the decision-making (HDMID) in your organization? 
15. Remarks 
 Answers to the overview questions above were then compared to the first set of 
questions wherein strengths, weaknesses and influential group members were 
identified.  Possible correlations of leader influence or inner-circle influence and 
manipulation can then be linked to the model identified as best for countering this 
influence.  The eight demographic questions below were used to validate participant 
qualifications and the generalized randomness desired in the population of participants 
(CMU, n.d.). 
16. How many years of military service have you completed (YrsSvc)? 
17. Which of the following best describes your race (PRace)?  (select more than one if 
appropriate) 
18. How much education do you have (PEdLvl)? 
19. What is your gender (PGndr)? 
20. What is your Rank/Grade (PRank)?   
21. Identify your branch of military service (PMilBr). 
22. What is your duty/position title(PosDes)?   
23. What is your age (PAge)? 
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 The estimated time for completion of scenarios and questions was 45 to 60 
minutes.  Participants were encouraged to complete the exercises in 45 minutes or less.  
It was anticipated that this length of time would increase external validity by 
encouraging participants to forward the scenario exercises to others as time and effort 
would not be too demanding for those with time constraints (ibid.).   
 The use of the electronic mail invitation to solicit participants allowed those 
deciding to respond to do so anonymously online without intervention by others or the 
researcher thereby strengthening internal and external validity (Grant, 2012).  The 
Qualtrics web based electronic link provided participants anonymous access to the 
scenarios without providing personal information that would otherwise reveal their 
identity.  The participant identity remains anonymous to the researcher.  Questionnaire 
results are tabulated in the Qualtrics research data base using a random participant 
number with no corresponding personal identification.  The number of participants and 
corresponding responses are the only information available to the researcher.  A copy 
of the Qualtrics questionnaire is included in Appendix B. 
Test Trial of Experiment 
 To insure a thorough understanding of the scenarios and the questionnaire, a pilot 
test of the experiment was conducted with volunteer members from various university 
cohorts.  The chair identified volunteers who met the desired qualifications of DoD 
experience and tenure.  To insure construct validity (CMU, n.d.), the volunteers were 
asked to provide recommendations and critiques required to clarify the scenarios and 
questionnaire.  The researcher asked for clarifications to uncover how to best replicate 
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actual settings of military decision forums involving HA projects and the Afghanistan 
withdrawal.   
 The test trial was distributed using the Qualtrics electronic link and the email 
request intended for later use for the final experiment.  The trial population was 
provided the scenario intent and target duration.  The actual responses of the trial group 
remained anonymous and secured in the Qualtrics database.  The trial responses were 
not used in the data analysis.  Trial members were able to provide remarks via email to 
the committee chair for consolidation before forwarding to the researcher.  Each trial 
member's identification was removed by the chair prior to forwarding to the researcher.   
 The volunteers for the trial test were selected based on military work experience 
plus knowledge of rational decision methods.  The trial group provided feedback on 
ease of access, length of exercise, time required, and the overall clarity of the exercise 
to include intent, scenario background, sequence of questions, and opportunities to 
provide remarks.  Comments and recommendations by the trial group include the 
following. 
 
1. The two scenarios appeared to be realistic and thorough (confirmation of 
construct validity). 
2. Terms used in the scenario are understood and familiar to participants. 
3. Scenario background and script were found to be both clear, and in need of the 
following additional information.   
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a. For the HA project scenario, improve background clarity to include 
command (leader) priorities to enable participants to better understand the 
best decision to be made.   
b. Specific reference to mission objectives and commander intent are needed in 
the background information of both scenarios. 
c. Background information must state the alternatives were obtained by 
brainstorming and analyzed for weighting of significance prior to 
discussions (a rational decision process).  Further, background must state 
this process was completed for each round of discussions. 
4. Time required to complete the scenario exercises is longer than the 
recommended 45 minutes. 
5. The background and script for the HA decisions appeared to be typical of these 
exercises, although this scenario appeared more complicated than the Afghan 
scenario (HA complexity is realistic and confirms construct validity). 
 
The scenarios were revised to shorten the scenario scripts as much as possible without 
loss of intent or the inner-circle of influence.  Revisions are indicated in it the scenario 
text of appendices C and D by use of italics.  Background information was reduced and 
made more concise by addition of a formal statement of commander (leader) intent and 
mission objectives.  The background information for each scenario was modified to 
stipulate the decision team was now in the closing rounds of discussion of the weighted 
alternatives prior to making a final decision.  The HA project scenario was revised to 
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explain the priorities of the commander.  The Afghan scenario was revised to be more 
concise and to match the HA scenario format.   
 Additional changes were considered such as limiting the participant’s role to 
evaluation of one scenario containing either the Delphi or CGPS methodology and/or 
reducing the number of questions.  It was decided to keep all of the questions and the 
two scenarios exercises, one each for Delphi and CGPS, to enable analysis of feedback 
comparing the two decision models.  After comparing the feedback and comments, 
consistency was found in the feedback indicating the need for two separate scenario 
settings (HA and Afghanistan) may not have been necessary.   
Data Collection 
  All data and feedback from participants was collected on the secured Qualtrics 
site, including those participants who entered the Qualtrics site and partially completed 
the scenarios or questionnaire.  Data collection included the participant responses, 
demographics, and participant factors such as the total number of participants, time 
required online, number of completed questionnaires, and the number of partially 
completed questionnaires.   
  The Qualtrics research tool simplified data collection by allowing participants 
direct access to the scenarios online by activating the hyper-link provided in the email 
invitation.  The electronic format was ideal for eliminating participant interaction with 
one another that could possible contaminate responses lessening the internal validity 
(Brogan, n.d.).  Similarly, interaction with the researcher was avoided to eliminate 
potential for contamination of responses resulting from directive guidance from the 
researcher (Grant, 2012).   
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 The Qualtrics suite provided participant demographics and the questionnaire 
responses.  The number of total participants and the time each was online in the 
Qualtrics suite is provided and will be of interest in determining the dropout rate and 
factors influencing non-participation when reviewing external validity (CMU, n.d.).  
Participant duration online also reflects the effectiveness of the scenario and 
questionnaire in complying with the desired target duration recommended in the email 
invitation.  Qualtrics presented a summary file of all data and remarks research variable 
above, and used in data analysis software to identify trends and common remarks 
pertinent to the research questions. 
 Overall feedback from participants centered on the main research topic of 
decision-making methodology, with no feedback indicating confusion or a lack of 
guidance in the scenario requirements lending high credibility to the responses.  
Feedback indicates the Qualtrics hyper-link provided ease of access to participants.  
Additionally, the Qualtrics tool offered data collection for research purposes while 
assuring participants of their anonymity prompting candid responses.  As a precaution, 
when using Qualtrics or similar automation, one should ensure scenario revisions and 
updates are recorded and saved for the final scenario exercises.  The exercise link 
distributed to participants must be tied to the final version of the scenarios, and not a 
previous version. 
Selection of Participants 
Sample Population 
 When establishing parameters for selection of participants, David Koenig (n.d.) 
recommends the researcher compile a list of characteristics desired for the ideal 
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candidate.  These characteristics and potential sources of acceptable candidates are the 
basis for the sampling strategy.  The characteristics must be tailored to identify 
candidates appropriate for the experiment involved.  The researcher must then identify 
a source of candidates who qualify for participation.  The candidates may then be asked 
to recommend others who qualify or to forward the request to participate to other 
candidates with the relevant characteristics (ibid.).  Candidates are informed they are 
permitted direct contact with their colleagues for the purpose of extending the exercise 
invitation, provided the candidate does not do so by use of mass-mailings such as mail-
list servers of service organization listings.  The candidates were asked to distribute the 
experiment to other divisions and members outside their immediate workgroup to avoid 
like minded responses that may be provided by the candidates’ colleagues or inner-
circle.  The randomization of the distribution reinforces the external validity of 
researcher’s findings (CMU, n.d.).   
 This use of referral contact among colleagues and friends is known as network 
sampling or the snowball effect.  In the past, it was known to be effective in growing 
the sample population, (Koenig, n.d.).  As explained below, a rather large sample group 
is desirable.  The sample group can then be reviewed for relevant characteristics and 
those not meeting the criteria eliminated from data collection (Brogan, n.d.). 
 The sample size is calculated based on the degree of accuracy desired.  The larger 
the sample size, the more accurate the data results will be when using a random sample 
(Hayes, 1994).  The data results will approximate a normal distribution curve and the 
central limit theorem applies for data fitting the normal distribution.  As determined by 
John Tukey, a minimum sample size of 77 members is needed to obtain such a 
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distribution (ibid.).  As stated by Dr. Joe Rodgers, professor of statistics at the 
University of Oklahoma, a population of 90 is the accepted standard for a minimum 
sample size to achieve a normal distribution, with 30 participants the desired number 
for qualitative analysis.  Hayes (1994) explains a desired accuracy interval must be 
selected, represented by “z”, and using the recommended desired probability of 95% 
for the sample mean falling within 0.10 standard deviations (s) of the true mean, we can 
determine the desired sample size.  Hayes sets 0.1s equal to “z” (where z = 1.96), 
multiplied by “s”, and divided by the square root of the number of samples “N.”  That 
is, the Margin of Error = z(s
2
/N)
0.5 where substituting 1.96 for “z”, and 0.1s for the 
margin of error, we find N=385.  Therefore, it was determined an adequate sample 
minimum of 90 with a cut-off or maximum number approaching 200 would be effective 
to achieving the probability desired. 
Sampling Strategy 
 The three key elements of the sampling plan are; the desired characteristics for 
participants, identifying a pool of resources with highly qualified candidates, and use of 
network sampling.  Koenig (2010) recommends use of known sources of candidates 
such as an existing network of colleagues and associates.  To identify qualified 
participants who are subject matter experts, the characteristic requirements include the 
following. 
 Familiarity with the United States involvement in Afghanistan, and programs 
similar to HA. 
 Knowledge of military command group mission statements and objectives. 
 Experience using MDMP or other rational decision-making models. 
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 To validate candidate qualifications and fit within the desired characteristics, 
participants were required to provide demographic information regarding education 
(PEdLvl), years of experience (YrsSrv), rank or grade (PRank), service title (PosDes), 
and age (PAge), (Brogan, n.d.).   
 The intended target audience was DoD service members or civilians with training 
in rational decision making, namely the MDMP model or equivalent rational model.  
To insure proper training and background that would provide insight to the scenarios 
chosen, the targeted participants were senior members of each service department.  
Seniority is indicated by 15-plus years of service and rank or civilian grade.  Colleagues 
of the researcher, with military background and extensive work experience at the 
command level, were appropriate candidates for participation in the scenario exercise.  
These colleagues are journeyman service members, primarily officers and equivalent 
civilians and provide a pool of convenient candidates.   
 Candidate familiarity with the structured MDMP model, or other rational models, 
prepared them to review and analyze the Delphi and CGPS models for strengths 
(DMps), weaknesses (DMng), and to identify causality between the model and the 
group’s ability to counter inner-circle (Tinf) influence (Koenig, n.d.).  Service member 
participation and familiarity with HA and the war in Afghanistan reduced their learning 
curve in comprehending the background information for each of the scenarios.  A 
reduced learning curve was anticipated to lessen the burden on participants and increase 
external validity (CMU, n.d.). 
 The candidate pool consisted of journeyman colleagues of the researcher and 
university cohort students with the desired experience at senior joint military 
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commands and service component commands in the United States, Europe, and Asia.  
No single command or service organization was the focal point of this research.  
Anonymity of participation further eliminates data collection pertinent to a single 
organization and increases generalizability (CMU, n.d.).  Based on these factors above, 
it is understood there is no need for DoD approval to conduct this experiment as it is 
not focused upon a single military unit.  This dissertation research was approved by the 
University of Oklahoma Institutional Review Board prior to distribution of the email 
invitation to candidates. 
Informed Consent 
 The email invitation request for participation included the Qualtrics online link to 
direct participants to the introduction of the experiment with a mandatory informed 
consent statement for concurrence prior to participation.  Participants were informed by 
continuing with the exercise, their consent was acknowledged as granted and recorded 
in the Qualtrics data base.  The original research design called for snowball sampling to 
achieve the desired number of respondents. However, the response rate was lower than 
desired. New snowball threads were extended to persons meeting the inclusion criteria, 
yet only 23 participants completed the experiment. Since the number of participants 
was smaller than expected, full quantitative data analysis is not possible. This document 
reports the results of basic statistical analysis.  Commonality of data responses are 
reviewed for trends and then cross-tabulated with data for the two different scenarios 
and decision models to verify conclusions on effectiveness and majority preferences. 
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Demographic Information 
 The demographic data received from participants validated their qualifications 
and fit necessary for credible responses to the questionnaire.  Use of the demographic 
data as a whole was the basis for evaluating participants and validating the data 
collected from them.  Demographic data indicating the participant did not fit the 
required characteristics would have resulted in omission of the participants responses 
from the data analysis.  All participants were verified as meeting the desired 
qualifications.  Taken in part or as several factors together, the demographics provided 
validation of participants as follows: 
 
 Age (PAge), rank (PRank), and years of military service experience (YrsSrv): 
Participants were validated as senior, with training in rational decision-making 
(typically the MDMP). 
 Position title (PosDes), rank (PRank), and organization (PMilBr): Participants 
were senior in rank (Lieutenant Colonel or higher) with command experience in 
planning or programming of HA type projects.  The participants were also 
familiar with the ongoing withdrawal from Afghanistan.  
 
Additionally, the demographic information revealed the participants also had 
experience with rational decision models in addition to MDMP, or extensive 
organizational training in decision-making.  Demographic information provided the 
following: 
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 Branch of Military Service (PMilBr):  The senior Air Force and Navy 
participants were trained in the use of multiple decision-models such as the 
Delphi and nominal decision models. 
 Education (PEdLvl):  Participants received higher education at the master’s and 
doctoral level including organizational decision theory.   
 
All of the participants validated their level of experience, and familiarity with HA 
programs and the Afghanistan withdrawal, which made them ideal for participation in 
the experiment.   
THREATS TO VALIDITY 
 The success of the experimental design is dependent on maintaining a high level 
of validity.  There are three applicable measures of validity considered relative to the 
design of this experiment.  Construct validity measures how well the experiment 
replicates the concepts to be studied and the degree of accuracy in measuring results 
(CMU, n.d.).  Internal validity is a measure of the causality of changes in variable X 
resulting in observable changes in variable Y.  External validity considers the ability to 
generalize the results by applying them to a larger population (ibid.), and the ability to 
replicate this experiment in the future.   
 Construct validity concerns are satisfied by selection of participants with both 
familiarity of rational decision models and familiarity and experience in settings typical 
of the scenario backgrounds (Brogan, n.d.).  Demographics were used to verify 
randomization (PGndr, PRace, PosDes, and PMilBr) and validity (CMU, n.d.).  
Senior Air Force and Navy service schools provide training in the use of Delphi, 
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MDMP and nominal decision-making techniques.  The Army service schools provide 
FM 101-5 guidance for implementation of MDMP.  The construct validity is considered 
to be high as scenario design closely replicates a military decision process.  Feedback 
on realism and clarity of the pilot test further validated construct validity.   
 Internal validity is measured through perceptions of the decision model (X) 
effectiveness in countering inner-circle influence (Y) as identified by participants 
(ibid.).  Concerns for Internal validity were satisfied by use of scripted inner-circle 
influence in military decision-making scenarios for each decision model.  Participant 
were successful in identifying the inner-circle (Tinf) indicating senior military 
personnel and equivalent civilian participants were familiar with scenario parameters 
(ibid.).  Additionally, the Qualtrics tool offered data collection for research purposes 
while assuring participants of their anonymity prompting candid responses.  Qualtrics 
collation of data for reporting purposes aids in maintaining data reliability at a high 
level.  The randomization of participants through the snowball effect, together with the 
anonymity, and reliability, further contributed to the validity of the experiment (ibid.).    
 External validity measures participant fit, level of participation, and applicability 
of the decision model for comparison to other decision-making organizations (Brogan, 
n.d.).  The external validity is based upon the ability to translate the military setting to 
private industry and other government settings.  The ability to translate or generalize 
the results to other government settings is considered to be high, with moderate 
generalizability for private sector organizations (CMU, n.d.), provided they use rational 
decision methods or can modify their decision-making models to accommodate lessons 
learned from this experiment.   
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Chapter IV: Research Findings & Data Analysis 
 
 Recall from Chapter 3 that there were four cells in the experiment based on the 
order of presentation of the combination of scenario and decision-making technique. In 
this chapter, the anticipated and preferred decision is described based on the scenario as 
well as the decision-making technique.  Of the 42 persons who accessed the online 
survey, only 26 participants completed a majority of the exercise, with 23 completing 
the entire questionnaire.  This restricted sample size limits the type of analysis that can 
be performed to one of trend or pattern identification in responses using qualitative 
methods.  For qualitative analysis, 30 respondents would be desired as recommended 
by Joe Rodgers.  The availability of 26 responses is considered adequate for the 
questionnaire was extensive and the respondents who vested their time provided 
valuable feedback.  What are reported here are descriptive statistics.  Participant 
remarks and feedback will be discussed in the order received in response to the 
questionnaire. 
Responses Identifying Decision Outcomes 
Perceived Group v. Participant Preferred Decisions 
 When considering the difference between the perceived group and participant 
preferred decision based on scenario only – irrespective of whether it was presented as 
the first or second scenario - we find a high degree of concurrence.  For the Afghanistan 
withdrawal scenario, 71% of the time there was concurrence between the solution that 
the participant thought would be selected by the group and the participant’s preferred 
solution.  
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Perceived decision team would make: 
18 - Slow withdrawal w/Training tail 
  5 - Rapid withdrawal w/training tail 
  4 - Rapid withdrawal of all support 
  0 - Slow withdrawal w/full services 
  1 - no response 
 
Versus the participant’s choice 
 
Decision participant would make in this scenario:  
  7 - Rapid withdrawal w/Training tail 
  6 - Slow withdrawal w/Training tail 
  5 - Rapid withdrawal of all support 
  3 - Prolonged withdrawal w/full services 
  7 – no response 
 
 
The researcher attributes the difference in perceived team decision, and the decision the 
participant would make, to the participant’s recognition for the need to have extended 
training for stability in Afghanistan.  That is, participants believed the decision team 
would likely follow previous DoD policy to insure stability as a priority by extending 
the U.S. military in Afghanistan for training purposes.  Overall, the participants slightly 
favored the choice to follow new policy issued by the President calling for a rapid 
withdrawal.  This indicates their acceptance of new policy and willingness to overlook 
the need for long term stability in favor of new command guidance.  It is interesting to 
note this team decision was in direct opposition to the inner-circle influence for a rapid 
withdrawal (Appendix C, IC indicated between lines 128-133, 167-173, 202-212, 262-
268 and 287-289).   
 For the HA clinic location scenario, the concurrence between the perceived 
decision and the decision preferred by the participant was almost unanimous at 
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approximately 92%.  The researcher anticipated a high degree of concurrence for this 
scenario due to the influence of funding restraints and the overarching command 
guidance provided to the participants.   
 
Perceived decision team would make:  
 22 – Constanza (site of exercise) 
   4 – Bucharest (capitol) 
   2 – no response 
 
 
Versus the participant’s choice 
 
Decision participant would make in this scenario: 
20 - Constanza    
  6 - Bucharest 
 
That is, the participants would expect the Constanza site to be selected due to funding 
restraints and mission objectives despite the inner-circle preference for Bucharest 
(Appendix D, IC preference indicated between lines 120-127, 149-161, 186-202, 247-
250, 256-261, 307-308, 318-326, 336-338, and 346-351). 
Why Team Decision Was Made 
 For the Afghanistan scenario, the researcher concluded the participants 
recognized the correct decision would be to adhere to the President’s new policy for 
rapid withdrawal.  The participants also recognized the decision team was indicating 
there would likely be a future compromise to extend some minor role of U.S. military 
in Afghanistan.  The reasons provided for the team decision indicate the option for a 
long withdrawal and training tail would be the most logical withdrawal and still meet 
commander intent as indicated below. 
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Perceived reason team made this decision (Afghanistan): 
 12 - consensus on most logical, meets intent 
   2 - prior experience & SME input 
   1 - team input stressing need for training 
   1 - favored by Ch. Ops (IC) and Ch. Pans (leader) 
   1 - compromise of A1 and A2 
   1 - easiest 
   1 - groupthink & political posturing (IC) 
   1 - A1 quick exit 
 
The perceived reasons for the clinic site location conform to the researchers anticipated 
response.  That is, funding constraints would influence the decision.  However, it 
should be noted the mission objectives and the funding constraints are often 
interrelated.  These two reasons were the top responses indicated below. 
 
Perceived reason team made this decision (HA): 
 10 - cost / funding limits 
   6 - mission intent / charter 
   4 - majority vote / consensus 
   3 - cost & mission statement (Constanza) 
   2 - HN desires Bucharest (IC) 
   1 - Leader driven 
 
Note a high number of participants agreed with the perceived alternative selected by the 
scenario decision team.  This may be attributed to favoritism of that alternative by the 
participant or an indication the participant would make the right decision (same as the 
participant’s preferred alternative) despite inner-circle influence. 
 Evidence of misinterpretation or need for clarity in the scenarios was slight and 
reflected in only two responses indicating the decision required in the HA scenario was 
inappropriate for a military decision.  One response indicated local host nation 
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authorities and medical personnel should be the ones to make the HA decision.  This 
may be an indication that the participants were skimming the background or 
misunderstanding the role the clinic played in support of the military exercise to follow 
the HA project. The researcher assesses these two responses (indicating a 
misunderstanding of intent), as low in significance to the overall consistency of 
responses and validity for answering the research questions. 
Recognizing the Inner-Circle  
or High Influence 
 Recall the Afghanistan scenario team members exhibiting high influence as 
members of the inner-circle were the Chief, Intel and the Chief, Ops.  The Chief, Trng 
and Chief, Res were united in opposition to the inner-circle as indicated below. 
 
Team member w/most influence: 
 11 - Ch. Log 
   4 - Ch. Trng /Ch. Res (~IC) 
   4 - Ch. Ops (IC) 
   3 - SME’s 
   2 - Ch. Intel /Ch. Ops (IC) 
   1 - Ch. Trng (~IC) 
   1 - none, consensus 
 
As annotated by the (IC) and (~IC) above, 44% of the participants identified a member 
of the inner-circle (Chief Intel and Chief Ops), or a member of the united pair in 
opposition to the intended inner-circle (the Chief Trng and Chief Res), as having high 
influence.  The researcher did not intend for two inner-circles to be present in the 
scenarios.  However, this recognition serves as further validation that participants (or 
decision team members), will identify all forms of subgroups working together as an 
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inner-circle, and serves as validation of the inner-circle groupthink first proposed by 
Janis (1982) then ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius (1997), and captured in the public media as 
noted by James Fanto (2003).   
 It was not intended for the Chief Log to be recognized as having high influence 
in his role as a “peacemaker.”  By offering a new compromise alternative he was 
viewed as by half the participants as having high influence.  This perception may be of 
value for use in future decisions to gain influence by an individual or subgroup. 
Recall for the HA scenario design, the inner-circle consisted of the Romanian, 
Bulgarian, and Ukrainian representatives.  In this scenario it was much clearer to the 
participants who the members of high influence were as noted below. 
 
Team member w/most influence: 
 11 - Romanian (IC) 
   4 - nobody / equal participation 
   3 - Bulgarian (IC) 
   2 - EUCOM / team leader 
   1 - Albania 
   1 - Greece 
   1 - SME 
   5 - no response 
 
 
As indicated by the (IC) notation above, approximately 61% of the participants 
identified high influence of the inner-circle.  The team leader was also recognized as 
having high influence which is not surprising in his role as the DoD representative.  
Participants with DoD experience would be likely to recognize this team leader as 
having authority and high influence.  These responses are interpreted by the researcher 
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as indicating moderate to high reliability in participant ability to recognize influence of 
a subgroup or an inner-circle. 
Identifying the Inner-Circle Influence  
as Groupthink 
 A significant percentage of participants identified dominant team members as 
inner-circle influence exhibiting groupthink in the decision-making process.  Averaging 
the responses for the two models, approximately 50% identified members of the inner-
circle as having a high level of influence.  A slightly smaller group (approximately 
44%) of those respondents labeled this influence as groupthink (‘t Hart, Stern & 
Sundelius, 1997; Fanto, 2003).  Responses indicated the high influence team members 
either had an influence, or attempted to influence, the decision outcome. In responses 
where inner-circle influence or groupthink was not identified as a factor, participants 
indicated the decision was a consensus majority run as a democracy typical of the 
rational models proposed by Delbecq and Vande Ven (1971). 
 Table 4-1 below describes the “high influence” team members identified for each 
scenario by decision model.  For the responses identifying the team member with the 
most influence, again the notation (IC) is added to indicate if this team member was a 
part of the inner-circle scenario script.  A majority of the responses for the HA scenario 
correctly identified the members of the inner-circle as team members of high influence, 
and listed the possibility of groupthink as well.  This link of groupthink as inner-circle 
influence was also evident in the Afghanistan scenario.   
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Table 4-1:  Members of High Influence in the Delphi & CGPS Models 
 
 For the Afghanistan scenario, 23% of participants correctly identified the two 
inner-circle members intentionally written into the script (Intel and Ops Chiefs).  A 
smaller percentage (19%) responded by identifying two additional team members (Trng 
and Res Chiefs) as having high influence in their united opposition to the Intel and Ops 
Chiefs (IC).  This second pair (Trng and Res Chiefs) was also identified as forming an 
inner-circle of influence.  The occurrence of a second pair of inner-circle members was 
unintentional but added to the potential for participants to identify influence of an 
Afghanistan Team Member of Influence 
Delphi CGPS 
 
Team member w/most 
influence: 
  3 - Ch. Ops (IC) 
  2 - Ch. Intel and Ch. Ops (IC) 
  2 - Ch. Log 
  2 - Ch. Trng and Ch. Res (~IC) 
 
 
Team member w/most influence: 
  9 - Ch. Log 
  3 - SME’s 
  2 - Ch. Trng and Ch. Res (~IC) 
  1 - Ch. Ops (IC) 
  1 - Ch. Trng (~IC) 
  1 - none, consensus 
HA Team Member of Influence 
Delphi CGPS 
 
Team member w/most 
influence: 
 8 - Romania (IC) 
 4 - nobody / equal participation 
 3 - no response 
 2 - EUCOM / team leader 
 1 - Bulgaria (IC) 
 1 - Greece 
 
Team member w/most influence: 
  3 - Romanian (IC) 
  2 - Bulgarian (IC) 
  2 - no response 
  1 - Albania 
  1 - SME 
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inner-circle.  The total share of participants identifying the two inner-circles of 
influence is 42% when you combine responses for the two distinct groups labeled as 
high influence.    
 In the HA scenario, responses identified these high influence team members by 
their “grandstanding” or favoring political influence to sway the decision of the team.  
As a final observation, when asked, “what final decision will be made in this situation, 
and why?” participants explained the final decision would be based on consensus, 
mission objectives, and as stated by one participant, “political influence bordering on 
groupthink.”   
Characteristics of the Decision-Making Models 
Strengths & Weaknesses of Delphi & CGPS Models 
 As described in the responses below, the Delphi strengths include; anonymity 
(proposed by Helmer & Dalkey, 1999, to avoid emotion or personality conflicts), an 
iterative nature allowing decisions to evolve, equal sharing by each team member, less 
resources or logistical support required, it draws on SME and individual input, and is 
efficiently run by the group leader who attempts to reach a consensus.  Number of 
participant responses and comments on Delphi strengths are included here. 
 
Strengths of the Delphi decision model: 
  7 - efficiency of virtual method, anonymity avoids FtF conflict  
  6 - open & full discussion, shared information, w/no fear of retribution 
  3 - iterative/allowed for several discussions until consensus via written & verbal input 
  2 - equality/everyone had an equal voice 
  1 - attempts consensus 
  1 - draws on independent comments and analysis 
  1 - central control by leader avoids emotion 
  1 - independent expert opinion / SME 
  1 - less emotion/more time for input 
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The faults or weaknesses with the Delphi model centered on the lack of FtF richness 
identified as important for context when attempting consensus (Rescher, 1998).  Lack 
of FtF interaction is claimed as a cause for time consuming iterations (ibid.) and a lack 
of trust in the Delphi model thus leaving the final decision in the hands of the group 
leader by default.  Participants identify this lack of FtF richness in the Delphi model as 
a possible source of manipulation in the background between calls for input.  Actual 
responses identifying weaknesses are listed below. 
 
Weaknesses of the Delphi decision model: 
  6 - no FtF richness, groupthink can occur as members settle on input of others with no 
way to resolve lack of consensus 
  4 - time consuming / how to verify results 
  1 - hidden agendas may be easily hidden 
  1 - lacked weighting (note missing in background information) 
  1 - background manipulation by HN (IC) 
  1 - anonymity could not be guaranteed 
  1 - dialogue limited via team leader conduit 
  1 - trust is reduced due to virtual anonymity 
  1 - none 
 
 Responses describe strengths of the CGPS model as; open & candid 
communication for all, ability to add SME input, FtF richness, interaction among 
members, buy-in, and consensus building.  These strengths agree with benefits noted by 
‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius (1997).  The other significant advantage identified for CGPS 
is better understanding of the context of team member discussions through both verbal 
and non-verbal communication as proposed by Fuller and Aldag.  Participant comments 
on CGPS strengths are summarized below. 
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Strengths of the CGPS decision model: 
  5 - open & candid discussions, timely, with all having a say 
  4 - SME input 
  3 - FtF richness 
  2 - continuous feedback loop to introduce new information after evaluating 
alternatives 
  2 - collaboration and honest feedback  
  1 - interaction between members 
  1 - consensus building /leader in democratic role 
  1 - buy-in by team members 
 
 
 Weaknesses described for the CGPS model are; democratic or majority vote 
allowing personal opinion to sway the outcome.  Personal opinion was blamed for peer 
pressure (noted by Jablin & Putnam, 2000) to conform as a symptom of groupthink.  
Anonymity was also identified as a weakness in the CGPS model whereas it was 
identified as strength for the Delphi model.  In addition to being listed as a strength, FtF 
was also identified as a weakness due to the potential for personality conflicts in the 
CGPS model.  The participant responses for CGPS weaknesses are listed here. 
 
Weaknesses of the CGPS decision model: 
  4 - peer pressure or political pressure to conform 
  3 - strong personalities could sway the decision, or personality conflicts may occur 
  2 - alternatives not weighted for risk (note missing in background information) 
  2 - groupthink & political influence 
  1 - time consuming to reach consensus 
  1 - if no consensus then leader decides 
  1 - democratizes the process & allows personal opinion to become input 
  1 – none 
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Effectiveness of Delphi & CGPS Models 
 Responses indicate both the Delphi and CGPS decision-making models were 
interpreted to be effective decision tools.  A majority of participants stated both models 
provided an open environment for frank discussion allowing for dissention without 
reprisal .  Responses are summarized in table 4-3 below. 
 
Delphi and CGPS Benefits & Effectiveness 
 
Reason this method is best:    
  2 - Delphi allowed more discussion / interaction / iterative process 
  1 - Delphi ease of adding SME input 
  1 - Delphi less emotional than CGPS 
  3 - CGPS - both FtF & anonymous without emotion 
  3 - CGPS - includes more objective evaluation, evaluate & weigh alternatives 
  3 - CGPS - FtF richness is more interactive and forced consensus 
  2 - CGPS - FtF & electronic promotes discussion 
  2 - CGPS - open dialogue and SME input allowed members to change their minds 
  1 - CGPS - allows for non-verbal communication 
 
Perceived benefits using the preferred method: 
  1 - combination of both may reduce personal emotions in discussions 
  1 - Delphi - offers better understanding of issues 
  1 - Delphi - adds SME opinion versus just staff input 
  1 - Delphi - it wouldn’t 
  3 - CGPS - more inclusive/avoids decision-making in a vacuum/members commit 
  2 - CGPS - more input and open discussion of opposite view without reprisal 
  1 - CGPS - would decrease the time for decisions 
  1 - CGPS - consistency if leadership will buy-in 
 
Table 4-2:  Effectiveness of Delphi & CGPS Models 
 
 
 The participants desire to be heard during discussions, and to have a fair and 
impartial process to raise concerns over improper decision-making, appears to be the 
strengths desired in a rational model.  It is possible to satisfy their desires through use 
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of either the Delphi or the CGPS decision models, or a hybrid mix of the two.  The 
researcher interprets the responses (63%) in table 4-3 as validation the Delphi or CGPS 
models were selected as effective due to perceived communication richness.   
Preferred Decision-Making Abilities 
Decision-Making Model Preferred by Participant 
 After responding to questions on each of the two scenarios that they read, the 
participants were asked questions about their preferred decision-making model.  
Responses indicated 16 participants (70%) identified the GPS model as the preferred 
decision-making model (PpreDM) as indicated in figure 4-1 below.  
 
Figure 4-1:  Preferred Decision-Making Model 
  Six participants (26%) selected the Delphi model as preferred and 1 participant 
(4%) preferred a combination of the Delphi anonymity and CGPS FtF richness.  One 
participant indicated the preference is situational, based on the decision at hand and 
GGPS 
Delphi 
Other 
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availability of team members.  This response may offer the most insight as one model 
will not always be the best fit for the decision parameters involved.  The team leader or 
the group may need to decide which model is best for decision-making challenge. 
 The CGPS model is clearly the preferred decision-making model.  Participant’s 
responses identifying the favored decision-making model are listed below. 
 
Preferred decision method: 
16 - CGPS 
  6 - Delphi 
  1 - situational / leader selects  
 
 
The favorable characteristics of the CGPS model serve as validation it was perceived as 
more effective than the Delphi model.  The preferred characteristics identifying CGPS 
as best, its strengths, and the perceived benefits are consolidated and summarized 
below. 
 
Reason the CGPS model is best:    
  5 - FtF & electronic promotes discussion without emotion 
  3 - FtF richness is more interactive and forced consensus 
  3 - includes more objective evaluation, best evaluated & weighed alternatives 
  2 - open dialogue and SME input - allowed members to change their minds 
  1 - allows for non-verbal communication 
 
Strengths of the CGPS decision model: 
  5 - open & candid discussions, timely, with all having a say 
  4 - SME input 
  3 - FtF richness 
  2 – continuous feedback loop to introduce new information after evaluating 
alternatives 
  2 - collaboration and honest feedback  
  1 - interaction between members 
  1 - consensus building /leader in democratic role 
  1 - buy-in by team members 
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Perceived benefits using the CGPS model: 
  3 - more inclusive – avoids decision-making in a vacuum – members commit 
  2 - allows more input and open discussion of opposite view without reprisal 
  1 - would decrease the time for decisions 
  1 - consistency if leadership will buy-in 
 
 
 Although participants favored the CGPS model, both the CGPS and Delphi 
models were favored over the MDMP model due to communication richness or “voice” 
provided to team members in the decision-making process. The desire for “voice” 
validates the desirability of CGPS as noted by ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius (1997).  
Although the MDMP model offers a voice, it is perceived as too easily manipulated by 
the team, or inner- circle, unless “leadership buys-in” or enforces open communications 
as stated by one participant.  
The Value of Iterative or Continuous Feedback 
 The continuous feedback loop (listed as a CGPS strength above) is the key 
element that makes CGPS an effective decision-making tool in countering inner-circle 
influence (Fanto, 2003; ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 1997).  The significant difference 
between the value of feedback in the Delphi and CGPS models is the ability to 
continuously add new information for discussion in the CGPS model.  Unlike the 
iterative process in Delphi, the feedback loop in CGPS provides opportunities to revisit 
steps in the model and to apply critical thinking.  It should be noted here that the 
iterative process of Delphi also allows team members to revisit previous discussions 
and apply critical thinking, but the team leader may overlook this or decide not to 
include it in the next round of discussions. 
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  The other significant advantage identified for CGPS is the FtF richness and the 
opportunity for better understanding the context of team member discussion comments 
through both verbal and non-verbal communication.  The communication advantages of 
both Delphi and CGPS are summarized here. 
 
Delphi Communication Abilities: 
 efficiency of virtual method, anonymity avoids FtF conflict  
 open & full discussion, shared information, w/no fear of retribution 
  iterative / allowed for several discussions until consensus via written & verbal 
input 
 adds SME opinion versus just staff input 
 equality / everyone had an equal voice 
 attempts consensus 
 draws on independent comments and analysis 
 offers better understanding of issues 
 
 
 
CGPS Communication Abilities: 
 open & candid discussions, timely, with all having a say 
 SME input 
 FtF richness & electronic promotes consensus & discussion without emotion 
 continuous feedback loop to introduce new information after evaluating alternatives w/final 
discussion 
 collaboration and honest feedback  
 allows for non-verbal communication 
 interaction between members 
 consensus building /leader in democratic role 
 buy-in by team members 
 
 The FtF richness and CGPS continuous feedback facilitate critical thinking and 
full analysis of alternatives (Van Assche, 2008; Beebe & Masterson, 2003; Deutsch & 
Coleman, 2000; Jablin & Putnam, 2000; ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 1997).  The 
researcher interprets this difference (the participants desire for open communication 
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and continuous feedback opportunities), as validation of the significance the CGPS 
feedback loop plays in offering a second chance to be heard, or to counter inner-circle 
influence.   
Ability of Decision-Making Model to Counter Groupthink 
 The iterative Delphi model and the continuous feedback loop of CGPS both 
facilitate critical thinking and full analysis of alternatives.  Therefore, participants 
evaluated both models as facilitating critical thinking, additional evaluation of 
alternatives, and most important, an opportunity to voice opposition to counter inner-
circle influence.  Facilitation of critical thinking and opportunity to voice opposition 
were key factors in overcoming groupthink (Van Assche, 2008; ‘t Hart, Stern & 
Sundelius, 1997). 
 As noted in the strengths section above for both models, the potential for open 
communication (without retaliation), was the predominant reason participants listed for 
preferring either Delphi or CGPS to counter political grandstanding or members of high 
influence.  Participants were in agreement that either model would improve decision-
making in their home organization.  Responses indicated open communication during 
the decision-making process at the parent organization would result in better decisions.  
The researcher places high significance on participants’ desire for a decision model 
with open communication at their home organization where fear of reprisal from 
leadership (or perhaps the inner-circle), is absent.   
Preferred Decision-Making Model at Participants Home Organization 
 In an attempt to discover alternative decision-making models not found in 
literature, the questionnaire asked participants to identify the decision model used in 
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their home organization, explain why this model is used, identify who participates in 
the decision process in the organization, and to identify other decision models they 
considered superior to Delphi or CGPS.  As noted by a few of the participants, the 
decision-making model is often selected by the leader, or team leader within their 
organization.  Decision models in use by the participant’s home organization, reason 
for use, and decision team members, are described below in participant’s responses. 
 
Decision method used by Participant at work: 
 13 - MDMP 
   5 - CGPS  (1- CGPS short version) 
   2 - consensus driven method 
   2 - situational, method chosen based on type of decision to be made 
   1 - rational method 
   1 - statistical analysis 
 
 
Reason work team uses the method above: 
   9 – MDMP – doctrine/leader mandate/structured process/assess risk/assign weights 
   1 – MDMP reduces emotion 
   1 – MDMP gains buy-in 
   2 – consensus - knowledgeable staff sees all angles prior to vote 
   1 – situational - leader mandate 
   1 – rational process is the norm 
   1 – Statistical Analysis - based on fact, not opinion   
   1 – value analysis weighs alternatives 
   1 – CGPS - commitment to decision 
   1 – CGPS - offers full communication, FtF inclusive of non-verbal cues 
   1 – CGPS - allows leaders or knowledgeable members to easily influence others 
   1 – CGPS - more inclusive and less likely one or two voices will sway decision 
   1 – CGPS - more objective data input 
   1 – CGPS - SME input or input by others to assist less informed members 
 
Participant’s decision team at work consists of: 
 17 - leadership / division & branch chiefs 
   2 - staff member’s w/stake in outcome or as SME 
   1 - varies by level of importance 
   1 - SME’s (subject matter experts) 
 
85 
 
 Participants offered neither the home organization decision model nor any other 
models as superior to Delphi or CGPS.  One contribution of note here is the makeup of 
military decision teams as mostly senior officers or branch chiefs who are typically 
supervisors and may have subordinates on the decision team who could fall under their 
influence. 
Recommendations to Improve Delphi  
and CGPS Models 
 
 The questionnaire included a section for participants to offer insights and 
recommendation to improve the Delphi and CGPS models.  Responses were focused on 
both the weaknesses and the strengths of the models.  It is significant to note 22% of 
responses indicated the preferred model, either Delphi or CGPS, can be improved by 
combining strengths of the two models.  Participant recommendations for improvement 
are summarized here. 
 
Improvements recommend to the preferred DM:            
  3 - combine FtF and anonymous discussion (mix Delphi/CGPS) 
  5 - CGPS - weigh benefits and risk in a matrix of alternatives (background missing) 
  1 - CGPS - should vote after each discussion period 
  1 - CGPS - identify up front the constraints 
  1 - CGPS - final opinions could be anonymous (mix) 
  1 - CGPS - decision reviewed by a Delphi group(mix)   
  1 - CGPS - add video-conference (mix) 
  1 - CGPS - avoid grandstanding /speeches to sway 
  1 - CGPS - none 
  1 - Delphi - should include a final vote 
  1 - Delphi - weigh benefits and risk of each alternative 
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Most recommendations for CGPS focused on the possible addition of anonymous input 
or combining Delphi aspects of anonymity with CGPS procedures.  A recommendation 
to make final opinions anonymous could also stimulate open and honest feedback for 
the CGPS model.   
 The recommendation to add a matrix of alternatives and weighting to CGPS 
resulted from an accidental oversight in background information provided for both 
scenarios which would have stated the matrix was performed prior to each round of 
discussions .  One participant focused on the logistical concerns for most organizations 
in recommending use of video-teleconferencing as a method to improve the CGPS 
model and alleviate obstacles preventing assembly of team members.  As 
teleconference availability grows this may become a logical option.  The participant 
further explained the inability to assemble team members may require use of electronic 
media such as email in lieu of limited teleconference access.   
 Those preferring the Delphi model made two recommendations for improvement.  
Of particular interest is the significance behind the recommendation to combine Delphi 
with the FtF richness of CGPS.  To do so would result in Delphi being a CGPS 
approach with a panel of SME’s as typically Delphi members are selected for their 
expertise.  A decision team of SME’s would be ideal in any organization that has the 
resources available and the flexibility to panel members with the desired expertise.  It is 
unknown why more participants did not recommend combining the strengths of Delphi 
and CGPS.  Perhaps most believed either model alone was sufficient in countering 
groupthink. 
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Threats to Validity 
Examining the Effect of Order of Presentation 
 When considering the results across the four cells, it became evident that the 
majority of participants anticipated that the scenario group would select the same 
alternative, as the best final decision, as the one selected by the participant.  In the  
presentation of the first scenario, 21 out of 26 (81%) participants selected the same 
solution as what they anticipated for the group’s choice.  For the second scenario 
presented, there was slightly more variation with 67% preferring the same outcome as 
the group. Overall, the individual raw data responses exhibited consistency regardless 
of the order of scenario review by the participants, and reliability of data scoring 
remains high.  So there is no threat to the validity of the research design based on the 
order of presentation of the scenario and/or the decision-making technique. 
Limitations & Concerns 
 The use of DoD participants establishes a boundary for the sample population 
making it ideal for transferability to government organizations, all military services, but 
not as readily transferable to the private sector organization.  The intent to use military 
participants trained in rational methods may have introduced participant bias of the 
structured and regimental DoD environment.  For this reason, the data may not be 
highly transferable to private industry.  The use of DoD participants enabled the 
researcher to better understand and interpret responses indicating heavy military 
influences due to the researchers extensive background in DoD exercises at the 
combatant command level.  Limitation of participation to researcher colleagues and 
fellow cohort members hindered the “snowball” network effect in obtaining 
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participants.  For a qualitative study, the 26 responses provide adequate data for trend 
analysis sufficient to generalize these findings to the private sector and across most 
Government departments. 
 This replication experiment and post-test design does not include comparison with 
a known control group.  Therefore, the results of this current research are considered 
exploratory in value and representative of a pilot study (Grant, 2012).  The need for 
additional replication and future research to validate this experiment, combined with 
the limitations above, indicate low generalizability and construct validity.  Perhaps the 
results are more generalizable within DoD organizations than the privates sector until 
future replication indicates otherwise. 
Credibility of Scenarios & Questionnaire 
 Reviewing participation, a total of 42 participants started the questionnaire with 
only 26 participants completing a majority of the questions.  Of the 26, only 23 
participants responded to all questions without omissions.  Low participation and high 
dropout numbers are both negative indicators of time burden.  For Delphi versions of 
the scenarios, it is recommended future replication eliminate the initial round of 
discussions thereby limiting discussions to two rounds to reduce the burden on time 
required.  Concerns for construct validity in the scenarios centers on two threats to 
validity, the time burden of the scenarios, plus the unintentional addition of a second 
inner-circle and a peace-maker (an unknown variable) in the Afghanistan scenario.   
 Transferability of results from the Afghanistan scenario can be interpreted as 
strengthened by the addition of the second inner-circle.  Unfortunately, loss of focus 
and intent in this scenario may have resulted from the infusion of a peacemaker (Log 
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Chief) during the generation of alternatives.  The peacemaker role detracted from the 
overall generalizability of the Afghan results as the peacemaker was identified by a 
significant portion of responses as the most influential team member.  These threats to 
validity can easily be corrected and overcome in future replication. 
 Observations by participants indicated the presence of two distinct groups of high 
influence players in the Afghanistan scenario and identified both subgroups as inner-
circle influence.  The Training and Finance Chiefs working together to oppose the Intel 
and Operations Chiefs, were perceived as the second group of inner-circle influence.  
Fortunately, the second subgroup in the experiment was a duplication of the inner-
circle.  Although not intended, the appearance of two different inner-circles actually 
enhanced the participant’s ability to identify the actions of an inner-circle, yet 
replication of the experiment should eliminate the appearance of a second subgroup. 
 Additional comments related to mission and commander’s intent indicated the 
participants were concerned with the actual impacts of the decision and evaluated 
decision alternatives accordingly.  This concern provided the participant with insights 
as to roles of the “subordinate command” in the Afghan scenario and impacts to be 
considered by scenario players.  That is, the Joint Staff (JS) issued guidance for the 
subordinate DoD directorates to consider in making the Afghan decision and weighting 
of potential impacts related to implementation of each alternative for possible success 
in achieving the JS objectives.  In the HA scenario, participants indicated a preference 
for more upper level guidance.  Definitive guidance was intentionally not provided in 
the HA scenario as most exercises of this type are more open ended and developed 
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jointly with the host nation.  Overall, participant feedback of insights and mission 
parameters is again a good indicator of moderate construct validity (CMU, n.d.). 
Participants Bias 
 The 26 participants who completed the scenario exercises provided insightful 
remarks based on familiarity with military settings and discussions presented in the two 
scenario exercises.  The rank, or grade, and position title (PosDes) of the service 
members or civilian participants is also an indicator of experience level and familiarity 
with the situational parameters included in scenario backgrounds.  As indicated below, 
only one participant actually has less than 15 years of experience (YrsSrv) and no 
advanced university graduate work.  At the opposite end of the experience scale, two of 
the participants possess over 40 years of experience.  Although two participants were 
lower rank (Major) than the target rank of Lieutenant Colonel, the position titles of 
either operations or engineer planners, and military strategist, indicate job experience 
provides them with the familiarity and knowledge desired for participation.  
Demographic of all 26 participants indicated they met the desired qualifications.  
Internal validity measured by fit of participant remained strong (Brogan, n.d.). 
 As depicted in table 4-3 below, the number of demographic responses closely 
matches the number of completed questionnaires.  For this reason, the demographic 
data appears to be a true representation of the participants who completed the exercise.  
The demographic questions were included at the end of the questionnaire.  Three of the 
26 respondents did not complete the demographic section, but answered the 
questionnaire pertinent to the scenarios.  The demographics were reviewed to verify the 
desirability of the participant based on experience (YrsSrv) and training (PEdLvl) in 
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use of rational decision models plus familiarity with HA projects and the withdrawal 
from Afghanistan (PosDes).  High education levels (Masters and Ph.D) of participants 
verified their familiarity with organizational decision theory and their ability to offer 
credible feedback of different perspectives in their responses. 
   
 
Participant Demographics 
 
 
Education Level: 
   1 - undergraduate degree 
   2 - partial graduate work 
 22 - masters degree 
  
Experience Level: 
   1 – (10-14 years) 
   2 – (15-20 years)  
 23 – over 20 years 
   2 – over 40 years 
   
Rank or Grade: 
   2 – Major/04 (GS 12 or 13 Civilian) 
 16 – Lt. Col./05 (GS 14) 
   7 – Colonel/06 (GS 15) 
 
Job Title or Position: 
  1 – operations Lead Planner 
  2 – engineer planner  
  3 – military strategist 
 
DoD Service Component: 
   1 - Air Force 
 20 - Army 
   5 - Navy 
  
Gender: 
 23 - male 
   3 - female 
 
Table 4-3:  Demographic Data 
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  The ratio of male to female in table is typical of that found within the senior 
military ranks and senior Government civilians, that is, female numbers represent the 
lower percentile.  Comments did not voice any gender concerns or perceived 
advantages for one decision-making model over another based on gender bias toward 
one model as more supportive or useful to female leaders.  The low response rate by 
females may require this issue to be revisited in future research to increase 
generalizability and external validity (CMU, n.d.). 
 As explained by Air Force and Navy colleagues of the researcher, their service 
schools differed from Army training in decision-making methods offered.  Army 
service members are trained to use primarily the MDMP model.  Army participants 
used the MDMP model for comparison to the Delphi and CGPS models in their 
remarks and indicated a bias in favor of CGPS which is similar to MDMP.  The Air 
Force and Navy participants are trained in use of a wider variety of decision-making 
models with no preference of use given to MDMP.  A bias in favor of other decision-
making models would be expected from the Air Force and Navy participants.  This bias 
was not evident in responses due to a lower participation rate by members of those 
services.  The responses were primarily from Army members and thus reflect an 
MDMP bias in comparisons.  The absence of participants representing the Marine 
Corps is not unexpected as this service is the smallest military organization.  Members 
of the Air Force, Navy and Army, all indicated openness to MDMP, Delphi, and CGPS.   
 Overall diversity of the participants (PosDes, PRace and PGndr) and diversity 
among the military services (PMilBr) was validated by the demographic information 
thereby strengthening external validity (CMU, n.d.).  Future replication of this 
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experiment has potential for both government and large private sector organizations.  
Replication in military organizations is most practical for service schools or the War 
Colleges.  Replication by a service school promises high participation levels ideal for 
full statistical analysis.  Large corporations with formalized training in decision-making 
hold potential for replication with high participation and should be considered as 
desirable candidates for replication. 
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Chapter V: Summary & Conclusions 
 
 This research was intended to resolve and validate inner-circle influence as 
groupthink, and to identify if there is an effective tool for countering this influence 
during decision-making within organizations.  This current research validated inner-
circle influence as groupthink per the perceptions of participants in an experimental 
exercise for this purpose and concludes that CGPS can be an effective tool for 
countering this influence.  In this section, we directly answer the six research questions 
and consider the contribution of our research results to extent theory and explore the 
practical implications of our findings. 
 
Research Question  
Summaries 
 Research Question 1:  Are research participants able to identify inner-circle 
influence, or directive influences, and will they identify this influence as groupthink? 
 A significant number of participants recognized the high influence of team 
members and recognized a strong correlation between this influence and the decision 
outcome.  It is concluded by the researcher that this inner-circle influence or groupthink 
may be responsible for manipulating a decision outcome as suggested by Van Assche 
(2008), Yukl (2002), ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius (1997), and Janis in 1982 
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 Research Question 2:  Do participants view the Delphi and CGPS decision-
making models effective, and if yes, do participants agree these models counter the 
inner-circle influence?  
 Responses and data analysis indicate both the Delphi and CGPS decision-making 
models were interpreted to be effective decision tools and effective at countering the 
inner-circle of influence.  These models were recognized as effective rational decision-
making procedures effective in evaluation of alternatives and improving the final 
decision outcome.  True Delphi requires the use SME’s and may not be as practical for 
all decisions.  The CGPS model holds more promise for organizations with limited 
availability of subject matter experts.  The success of the CGPS is founded upon 
application of the continuous feedback loop (for second chances & critical thinking) 
recognized by Van Assche (2008) and ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius (1997). 
 Research Question 3:  Is the Delphi model or the CGPS model more effective in 
countering directive or inner-circle influence? 
 Data analysis and responses both indicated the continuous feedback loop as a 
strength that makes CGPS a more effective decision-making tool in countering inner-
circle influence.  The other significant advantage identified for CGPS is the FtF 
richness and the opportunity for better understanding the context of team member 
discussions through both verbal and non-verbal communication.  This open 
communication forum without fear of reprisal against honest feedback was a significant 
inherent advantage in the CGPS model.  Note this CGPS model is the Aldag & Fuller 
model as modified by ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius (1997) to include continuous feedback 
loops (figure 2-3), to capture the dynamic and evolving process that is decision-making. 
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 Research Question 4:  What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Delphi and 
CGPS models?  
 As described in the responses, the Delphi strengths include; anonymity (which 
avoids emotion or personality conflicts), an iterative nature allowing decisions to 
evolve, equal sharing by each team member, less resources or logistical support 
required, it draws on SME and individual input, and is efficiently run by the group 
leader who attempts to reach a consensus.  The faults or weaknesses with the Delphi 
model centered on the lack of FtF richness identified as important for context and trust 
when attempting consensus.  As noted by Rescher (1998), these traits are inherent in 
the Delphi technique as it relies upon the team leader for effective execution and 
drawing conclusions for the final decision.  
 Responses describe strengths of the CGPS model as; open & candid 
communication for all, ability to add SME input, FtF richness (verbal & non-verbal), 
interaction among members, continuous feedback, buy-in, ability to counter high 
influence, and consensus building.  Weaknesses described for the CGPS model are; 
democratic or majority vote allowing personal opinion and peer pressure to sway the 
outcome.  Personality conflicts were also described as a weakness in CGPS due to 
potential FtF confrontation.  These weaknesses and strengths are known to parallel each 
other.  Confrontation may be necessary to allow those outside the inner-circle to 
challenge and overcome the inner-circle influence.  Approval to challenge the inner-
circle influence must be granted by leadership and those of high influence (‘t Hart, 
Stern & Sundelius, 1997). 
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 Research Question 5:  Is the use of Delphi and CGPS with a feedback loop useful 
in identifying directive or inner-circle influence and countering its effect? 
 Responses indicate a positive correlation between the preferred decision-making 
model and members of high influence (inner-circle members).  The researcher 
interprets this significance, and the responses indicating need for open communication 
with a feedback loop, as validation of the CGPS model with continuous feedback as 
recommended by ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius as highly significant for countering inner-
circle influence.  Organizations may easily adopt use of continuous feedback in their 
current decision-making models by addition of reviews or “second chance” 
opportunities making this key element practical for application.  For these reasons, the 
CGPS model should be widely considered for application in real decision-making 
environments, especially in hierarchal organizations to insure all levels of participation 
are given a voice and opportunity to participate.  The Army War College, and all DoD 
senior universities, should consider inclusion of CGPS with recommendations for 
leaders to consider its use and the use of the Crisis Action Planning Model as decision-
making tools more open to participation and creative synergy than the limited MDMP 
model. 
 Research Question 6:  How can the preferred decision-making model be 
improved?  
 It is significant to note 22% of responses indicated the preferred model, either 
Delphi or CGPS, can be improved by combining strengths of the two models.  Most 
recommendations for CGPS alone focused on the possible addition of anonymous input 
or combining Delphi aspects of anonymity of “voting” within CGPS procedures to 
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stimulate open and honest feedback for the CGPS model.  One participant 
recommended use of video teleconferencing as a method to improve the CGPS model 
and alleviate obstacles preventing assembly of team members.  As teleconference 
availability grows it may become a logical option for increasing frequency of CGPS 
use, if not increasing and improving quality of discussions.  Although, the participants 
were asked if they could recommend a decision-making model they considered to be 
superior to Delphi or CGPS, no superior models were identified. 
Research Contributions 
 This research contributes to decision-making knowledge, leadership awareness, 
and team member satisfaction.  The first contribution is awareness of the value of 
constant feedback during rational decision-making to counter poor decisions and 
namely undue influence (and inner-circle manipulation) in the decision process.  
Although, Janis, Yukl, and Van Assche all note inner-circle influence may have a 
negative impact on decision-making, they do not propose a method to counter this 
influence.  Literature indicates the inner-circle may have both positive and negative 
impacts on decision-making, yet only ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius have captured the 
continuous feedback process as both a tool for improving decision-making and for 
countering the negative influence of the inner-circle.  Although Fanto recommends the 
assignment of an impartial and/or outside CEO to oversee corporate decisions to 
counter inner-circle manipulation, he does not identify tools the CEO may use to do so.  
The CGPS is one tool the CEO may turn to if manipulation is suspected or synergy is 
lacking.  The CGPS possibly could have overcome the high influence of the Vulcans 
during the Bush administration decision to enter Iraq, if President Bush had positioned 
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himself outside of his inner-circle (the Vulcans) and challenged past assumptions or 
provided second chance reviews inherent in CGPS.  Van Assche recognized the need 
for continuous feedback to overcome the hubris associated with the Iraq decision.  The 
CGPS is one tool to offer this continuous second chance to introduce new information 
and overcome past assumptions.  Perhaps a diversified inner-circle of advisors for 
President Bush, similar to the cabinet members under President Lincoln (as described in 
the creative diversity of talents section of this paper), would also have improved the 
Iraq decision.  The impartial leader must recognize and employ diversity and decision 
tools such as CGPS or the Crisis Action Planning Model (or similar continuous 
feedback process) to enable the decision-making team to overcome shortfalls and what 
they don’t know. 
 The second significant contribution is the validation of inner-circle influence as a 
newly recognized definition of groupthink.  This perception is held by both the public 
media and by individual participants.  This data lends credibility to the assertion by ‘t 
Hart, Stern & Sundelius (1997) that we have moved beyond the definition of 
groupthink first proposed by Janis, perhaps to one of inner-circle influence.  Perhaps 
the revised definition of groupthink by Yukl (p.251, 2013) may be further amended to 
capture this new public media definition as follows; groupthink occurs when members 
of a cohesive group are unwilling to question the majority viewpoint or the viewpoint 
of an influential inner-circle for fear of social rejection.  The result is a loss of creativity 
of alternatives and less than full consideration of options prior to the decision. 
 The research also contributes to our understanding of the potential – promise and 
pitfalls – for using experimental designs to a greater extent in social science research.  
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Failure to achieve adequate participation is indicative of the falling response rates 
realized in many empirical studies today.  The researcher considered use of proxy 
populations as having systemic problems when replicating the expertise and norms 
established by professionals which may result in limited internal validity (Tao & 
Franklin, 2012). The researcher relied upon a sample population of convenience and the 
snowball effect (CMU, n.d.) which fell short of the participation targets after multiple 
attempts.  One potential for overcoming lack of participation is the combined use of 
professionals and proxy populations (perhaps students), who are screened for attributes 
appropriate for the experiment or for a specific phase of the experiment (ibid.).  The 
challenge then becomes identification and rank ordering of attributes and effectively 
validating qualifications of proxy candidates.  The default option is to seek larger 
candidate pools of professionals to achieve desired participation levels (ibid.). 
 This experiment offers insights on electronic distribution and the potential for 
global networking.  The use of internet (Qualtrics) based scenario exercises proved to 
be timely, convenient to participants, economical, and allowed the distribution on a 
global scale.  The latter benefit is important when reaching-out to participants in 
Europe or outside the continental United States.  The inclusion of the HA scenario 
made participation by colleagues located in Germany very desirable.  Their access and 
participation was facilitated by the Qualtrics online suite wherein consent agreements, 
participant demographics, organizational procedures, and personal comments are 
secured.  The global reach capability of the online distribution would normally increase 
participation and external validity although the results indicate this did not occur under 
the network or snowball effect (Koenig, n.d.).  The results indicate the best fit of 
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participants through the global distribution rather than increased participation.  Use of 
electronic media is highly recommended for sharing the experiments within distribution 
networks in future research or replication of this experiment.  
 A contribution for improvement of electronic distribution concerns this 
experiments failure to include an updated internet hyper-link in the introductory email 
to connect the participants to the final version of the scenario background information.  
It appears the link connected the trial version of the background information which did 
not include updates clarifying the alternatives had been analyzed, revised or made new, 
and weighted prior to rank ordering for the next round of discussions in the scenario 
scripts.  Feedback from participants focused on the need to generate new alternatives 
and weighting of alternatives during each round of discussions.  The need for this 
clarity may have detracted from credibility of some comments and the participants 
focus on scenario players of high influence and the effectiveness of the decision-
making model, resulting in reduced construct validity (ibid.).  Perhaps future replication 
of this experiment should include one round of alternative evaluation and weighting 
followed by one round of alternative discussions prior to a final decision.  
Future Research 
 This exploratory research serves as a pilot study for future research.  Due to the 
limitations of sample population and the corresponding reduction in external validity, 
the experiment is in need of future replication.  The experiment design limitations also 
lower the internal validity and require replication within organizations outside the 
government (Koenig, n.d.; Brogan, n.d.).  Future research with larger populations and 
non-military members may offer additional credibility that is lacking for this 
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experiment.  Replication with candidates from within large organizations such as auto 
industries, or telecommunications firms, may prove of value in achieving adequate 
participation.  Perhaps an ideal source for candidates is the DoD military service 
schools, or War Colleges, where replication is easily accommodated by a ready pool of 
experienced professionals.  It is recommended future replication consider concealment 
of the purpose in testing for signs of groupthink to further increase reliability of results.  
Although the participants in this experiment did correctly identify sings of inner-circle 
groupthink, the participants may not have placed significance on this influence if not 
cognizant of the intent to counter groupthink. 
 Replication of a similar scenario familiar to military, or one familiar to industry 
and perhaps one involving county emergency management organizations (hierarchal 
organizations) is appropriate.  Reduced time burden is recommended by use of a single 
scenario (or alternating distribution of scenarios when more than one is used), and by 
use of very short scripts when more than one scenario is included in the experiment.  A 
single setting would require only one background statement for the two decision-
making scenarios (Delphi and CGPS).   
 The questions pertaining to home organization are recommended for deletion as 
they proved non-beneficial.  To offer participants ease of access, use of electronic 
distribution is recommended for convenience and for potential increase in overall 
participation due to the global reach capability discussed previously.  The resulting 
increase in participation will enhance generalizability and increase the value of future 
replication to industry, DoD, all Government, and all hierarchal organizations, provided 
all validity and construct issues found in this experiment are removed. 
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 The value of replication can be realized in Sir Isaac Newton’s statement, “If I 
have seen farther, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants” (Deutsch & Coleman, 
2000, p. 354).  This current research and potential for replication offers the researcher a 
chance to contribute to the body of knowledge as well as future research.  Coach Jimmy 
Valvano once said, “A person really doesn’t become whole until he becomes a part of 
something that’s bigger than himself”, (Krzyzewski & Phillips, 2004, p. 254).  
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Appendix A: Introductory Email 
From: Sarver, Christopher C. [mailto:xxxxxxxx@ou.edu] 
Sent: Monday, August 01, 2011 8:31 PM 
To: (candidates) 
Subject: Request Your Participation in Survey 
 
(Candidate Name) 
 
I am completing my doctoral studies at the University of Oklahoma.  To finish 
my degree requirements, I am conducting research entitled "Countering 
Groupthink; The Inner Circle of Influence."  I am writing to request your 
assistance in my research.  I believe you will enjoy reviewing and learning 
the two highly recommended decision-making techniques in this survey. 
Please focus on the technique used and the team players in each scenario. 
You may want to take some notes when reading the scenario to help you in 
answering the survey.  The scenario's do not include any classified 
information and are drawn from public news sources and my personal 
experience.  Please complete the survey prior to 25 August to allow analysis 
of results this summer. 
 
This link takes you to an online survey that should take approximately an 
hour or less to complete. 
 
If the link doesn't work when you click on it then cut and paste the link 
below into your browser. 
http://oucas.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_6QMUnXXXXXXXXza 
<http://oucas.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_6QMUnXXXXXXXXza> 
 
All data collected will be anonymous in that it does not ask you for your 
name and will not identify you with your responses in any way. None of the 
research results or responses will be shared with the Department of Defense 
(DoD). 
 
Also, if you have any friends who have a similar level of military experience 
and training, please either 1) send the attached flyer to them requesting 
their participation, or 2) forward this email to them directly with your 
request to participate.  Please do not forward this email request to your 
entire unit, a group list, or any listserve addresses. 
 
NOTE:  To navigate back or forward in the survey, use the arrows at the 
bottom of the survey screen, and not the back arrow.  If you use the back 
arrow it may exit you from the survey.  If this happens, use the forward 
arrow on your browser to return to the survey.  Please let me know if you 
would like a copy of the survey analysis when completed. 
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Thank you in advance for your help and your time. 
 
Chris Sarver 
Phone: (xxx-xxx-xxxx) 
   " The University of Oklahoma is an Equal Opportunity Institution. " 
 
PS - see the flyer attached for a promotional hook, and please forward to 
individuals you know that are at the 05/04-Level and above who would be good 
candidates.  Please do not forward to any "group-list".  Thanks again. 
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Appendix B: Questionnaire & Consent 
 
 
1.  Good day, I am Chris Sarver, a graduate student in the Political Science Department 
at the University of the Oklahoma. I am requesting that you participate in a research 
study titled "Countering Groupthink: The Inner Circle of Influence". You were selected 
as a possible participant because you have military experience. Please read this 
information and ask me any questions that you may have before agreeing to take part in 
this study.   
 
Purpose of the Research Study: The purpose of this study is to learn which decision-
making method you think provides the best solution after reading fictitious scenarios 
about military planning efforts.   
 
Procedures: If you agree to be in this study, you will complete a survey after reading 
this page. 
 
 Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study: The study has no risks or benefits.   
 
Compensation:  
You will not be compensated for your time and participation in this study.   
Voluntary Nature of the Study: Participation in this study is voluntary. Your decision 
whether or not to participate will not result in penalty or loss of benefits to which you 
are otherwise entitled. If you decide to participate, you are free not to answer any 
question or discontinue participation at any time without penalty or a loss of benefits to 
which you are otherwise entitled.   
 
Length of Participation: Less than 45 minutes   
 
Confidentiality: Your responses are anonymous. The records of this study will be kept 
private and your supervisor will not have access to your responses. In published reports, 
there will be no information included that will make it possible to identify you as a 
research participant. Research records will be stored securely. Only approved 
researchers and the OU-NC IRB will have access to the records.   
 
Contacts and Questions: If you have concerns or complaints about the research, please 
contact me at (xxx-xxx-xxxx), or csarver@ou.edu. You can also contact my faculty 
supervisor, Prof. Aimee L. Franklin at(xxx-xxx-xxxx) or xxxxx@ou.edu. In the event 
of a research-related injury, contact the researcher(s). You are encouraged to contact 
the researcher(s) if you have any questions. If you have any questions, concerns, or 
complaints about the research or about your rights and wish to talk to someone other 
than the individuals on the research team, or if you cannot reach the research team, you 
may contact the University of Oklahoma – Norman Campus Institutional Review Board 
(OU-NC IRB) at (405) 325-8110 or irb@ou.edu.   
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By completing and returning this questionnaire, I am agreeing to participate in this 
study. Please print this page for your records. 
 
    
1 Agree 
  
 
100% 
2 Decline 
 
 
0% 
 Total  100% 
 
2.  To capture your thoughts on different decision-making methods, we present 
two military planning scenarios, each using a decision-making technique different 
from the structure found in the Military Decision-making Process.  After reading 
each scenario, you are presented with some questions about the decision-making 
method used in the scenario.  Using your last name, please pick a category. 
 
3.  Please answer the following questions about the decision-making scenario and 
transcript you just read.  What decision do you think was made in this situation 
(which alternative did they select, A1, A2, A3, etc.)? 
 
4.  Why do you think that decision was made? 
 
5.  What do you think the decision should be (which alternative do you think they 
should have picked A1, A2, A3, etc.)? 
 
6.  If the alternative you select above is different from the alternative you think the 
team selected in the scenario, why is your selected alternative better?    (If you 
selected the same alternative, enter "same") 
 
7.  Excluding the group leader, who on the decision team had the most influence 
on the decision? 
 
8.  What are the strengths of the decision techniques used in this scenario?  
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9.  What are the weaknesses of the decision techniques used in this scenario? 
 
10.  The next set of questions asks about decision-making techniques that your 
organization uses or that you would prefer.  Thinking back on the two scenarios 
you read, which decision-making method (the GGPS technique, or the Delphi 
technique) do you think yielded the best decision?  
 
11.  Why did you select this decision-making process as the best technique used in 
the two scenarios? 
 
12.  Is it possible to improve the decision-making technique you selected as best, 
and how would you do so? 
 
13.  What is the decision-making method used by you and your colleagues? 
 
14.  Why do you and your colleagues favor this decision-making method? 
 
15.  Who in your organization is usually involved in decision-making? 
 
16.  If your organization were to start using the decision-making technique you 
selected as best, how would it improve the decision-making in your organization? 
 
17.  Remarks:  (Include any additional thoughts on the decision-making process 
not included above? 
 
18.  Demographic questions. How many years of military service have you 
completed? 
 
19.  Which of the following best describes your race?  (select more than one if 
appropriate) 
 
20.  How much education do you have? 
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21.  What is your gender? 
 
22.  Grade 
 
23.  Identify your branch of military service. 
 
24.  What is your duty/position title?   
 
25.  What is your age?   
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Appendix C: Afghanistan Scenario 1 
AFGHANISTAN Scenario Introduction: [SAME FOR DELPHI AND 2 
GGPS] 3 
The President has requested the Secretary of Defense (the Secretary) to prepare 4 
a realistic schedule of withdrawal from Afghanistan beginning in the year 2014.  5 
The schedule shall accommodate current political views, the stability level 6 
within Afghanistan, and the ability of the Afghan government to rule effectively. 7 
AFGHANISTAN Scenario Background: [SAME FOR DELPHI AND 8 
GGPS] 9 
The Secretary has tasked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the 10 
Secretary of Defense (OSD), to formulate a recommended withdrawal schedule.  11 
The schedule shall address the concerns of the President as noted above, and 12 
shall consider a withdrawal schedules of both short, or immediate withdrawal 13 
(alternative A1), and a prolonged withdrawal (alternative A2).  The extended 14 
schedule, if necessary, is to allow for stability within Afghanistan to insure the 15 
success of the Afghan government.  Consideration of a short duration 16 
withdrawal is a new requirement.  Previously, OSD had considered and 17 
recommended a prolonged schedule for withdrawal for the previous 18 
administration.  A new OSD issued mission statement was provided below as 19 
guidance to the OSD Directorates now tasked to plan the withdrawal of forces. 20 
 21 
Mission Statement:  Plan for withdrawal of a majority of the existing combat 22 
forces and major supporting elements from Afghanistan prior to the end of fiscal 23 
year 2014.  Combat forces and related support remaining after 2014 shall be 24 
withdrawn in fiscal year 2015.  Withdrawal considerations shall include support 25 
to the Afghan government to insure a prolonged stability in Afghanistan beyond 26 
the withdrawal schedule. 27 
 28 
The OSD Directors are responsible for advising the Secretaries on matters of 29 
National Security.  The directorates comprise of eight divisions specializing in 30 
lead and support roles required for military operations.  Typically, 31 
representatives from each of the directorates involved with planning and 32 
decision-making events are called to form a committee or special action group.  33 
The Directors and the Secretaries are advised through group or committee 34 
recommendations. 35 
 36 
The OSD Directorates have received this task from the Secretary’s office.  Each 37 
of the primary directorates participated in drafting the previous schedule for a 38 
prolonged withdrawal.  Conveniently, each of the directorates is located in the 39 
Pentagon and each has participated in previous task requiring similar joint effort 40 
by multiple directorates.  A meeting date and time was established for the 41 
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directorates to meet and discuss the schedule.  Each directorate was represented 42 
by a senior staff member. 43 
 44 
The senior staff members are advised daily of public opinion and concerns 45 
reported by the press.  More importantly, the senior staff has detailed status 46 
reports describing current Afghan military strength, government stability, and 47 
attempts by neighboring countries to influence stability in Afghanistan.  48 
 49 
The OSD Planning Directorate (J5) representative was assigned as leader of the 50 
scheduling group.  The three key directorates on the joint staff involved in most 51 
decisions impacting ongoing operations are the Intelligence directorate (J2), the 52 
Operations directorate (J3), and the Logistics directorate (J4).  Each had a 53 
member at the scheduling meeting in addition to the Information Management 54 
directorate (J6), the Training & Exercises directorate (J7), and the Analysis & 55 
Finance directorate (J8).  Typically, the J2 and J8 provide most of the 56 
intelligence on current trends and possible near term events to be anticipated in 57 
each country.  The J1 directorate is routinely excluded from planning events as 58 
their function is primarily one of administrative support. 59 
 60 
The Director, J5, provided each directorate a copy of the OSD mission statement 61 
and the following Commanders Intent statement released by the Chairman’s 62 
office. 63 
 64 
Commander's Intent:  Provide stability operations and support to the Afghan 65 
government necessary to insure regional security and effective governance 66 
within Afghanistan during, and beyond, the withdrawal of U.S. military combat 67 
support elements. 68 
 69 
Several decision-making methods were proposed to guide the scheduling team 70 
in drafting a recommended schedule for review and approval by the Directors 71 
for their submission to the Secretary.  Transcripts of the decision-making 72 
discussion leading to the recommended schedule duration and the “official” 73 
summary of the decision-making process that will be made by the directorates 74 
are provided below.  Please read these documents and answer the questions that 75 
follow. 76 
AFGHANISTAN Transcript Minutes: 77 
Preliminary Discussions: [DELPHI] 78 
Due to travel schedules and the short time required for the J5 to recommend a 79 
withdrawal schedule, it was not possible to conduct a fact-to-face meeting with 80 
all of the directorate representatives.  For this reason, the J5 Director determined 81 
it best to assemble a virtual team of representative experts from each directorate.  82 
Each representative listed below is the subject matter expert for the directorate. 83 
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To initiate the virtual process, the J5 representative, COL Boomer, conducted 84 
preliminary discussion separately with each team member on 8 Nov 2010 by 85 
telephone contact.  He explained the task at hand, the mission statement and 86 
commanders intent.  COL Boomer informed the team of his intent to use the 87 
Delphi technique for discussions of the proposed schedule for withdrawal from 88 
Afghanistan.  The Delphi technique allowed each team member to remain 89 
anonymous while several rounds of discussion were conducted.  COL Boomer 90 
facilitated each round by consolidating comments from one round, then 91 
preparing a team recommendation for review and comment by the team in the 92 
next round in an effort to both improve the recommendation and reach a general 93 
consensus or majority decision.  The decision process and final recommendation 94 
required three rounds of comments during the week and concluded on 12 Nov 95 
2011. 96 
Meeting Date and Location: [GGPS] 97 
The meeting was called by the J5 Director to assemble a group to resolve the 98 
schedule duration for withdrawal from Afghanistan.  The meeting was 99 
conducted both 10 & 12 Nov 2010, in room 5E829 of the Pentagon.  100 
Discussions occurred for several hours with only the key points and comments 101 
captured in the notes below. 102 
Attendees: [SAME FOR DELPHI AND GGPS] 103 
Col. Michael Barnes, J2, Intelligence 104 
COL. Dennis Custer, J3, Operations 105 
CAPT.  Lawrence Parker, J4, Logistics 106 
COL. Rodney Boomer, J5, Planning 107 
Col. Alice Chaney, J6, Information Mgt 108 
COL.  David Sorensen, J7, Training & Education 109 
CAPT. Barbara Swanson, J8, Finance & Analysis               110 
                                          111 
Discussion Notes:  [DELPHI] 112 
COL Boomer opened virtual discussions with each member of the team 113 
concurrently by using a summary e-mail to capture points he had emphasized 114 
previously by telephone, and then asking the team members to review the two 115 
alternatives proposed by the Directors.  The first alternative (A1) calls for rapid 116 
withdrawal of all U.S. forces.  The second alternative (A2) requires partial 117 
withdrawal with a peacekeeping forces remaining for a prolonged period.  He 118 
included a questionnaire to collect individual responses on strengths, 119 
weaknesses and recommendations for possible changes to the alternatives.  He 120 
also questioned each member to identify the best alternative to include 121 
proposing a new alternate solution.  Team members were required to provide a 122 
justification for the alternative they selected as best.  It was agreed by the team 123 
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to conduct three rounds of comment by email, one daily between the 9th and 124 
11th of November.   125 
Comments Received 9 Nov 2001: 126 
Col Barnes, J2, stated he endorsed the idea of a rapid withdrawal (A 1).  127 
Intelligence reports indicate no known certainty of gaining any level of success 128 
from a prolonged withdrawal and thus A 2 is not recommended.   129 
COL Custer, J3, recommended an immediate, rapid withdrawal (A 1) similar to 130 
the previous drawdown in Iraq in order to gain more efficiency with the forces 131 
available.   132 
CAPT Parker, J4, proposed a new alternative and referred to it as an obvious 133 
compromise alternative (A3) by having a longer withdrawal period with less 134 
United States involvement not to include peacekeeping.  This new alternative 135 
was justified by the need to continue training of the Afghan police and Afghan 136 
military.  137 
Col Chaney, J6, stated the communications network in Afghanistan is now 138 
stable based on existing infrastructure and a commitment by the World Bank to 139 
develop a broader cellular network.  Therefore, A1 is recommended. 140 
COL Sorensen, J7, proposed a to allow gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces with a 141 
prolonged training mission until the Afghan government is prepared to operate 142 
on its own, similar to the A3 proposed by CAPT Parker. 143 
CAPT Swanson, J8, presented her teams analysis of the Afghan government as 144 
maturing but not yet ready to lead the nation.  She recommended prolonged 145 
peace keeping and training (A2/A3) for both the Afghan government and police. 146 
COL Boomer, J5, then reviewed all the comments and informed the group 147 
through individual emails of the collective thoughts on strengths and weaknesses 148 
of the two alternatives, A1 and A2, while carefully not identifying those who 149 
made the comments.  He presented the desires by many for a rapid withdrawal 150 
and presented several questions related to the ability of the Afghan government 151 
to rule effectively as it may not be mature enough to do so.  He then identified a 152 
new alternative (A3) for rapid withdrawal of combat troops while U.S. military 153 
trainers would remain for a prolonged period to train Afghan police and military 154 
on effective regional security required to establish a stable government.   155 
COL Boomer stated perhaps the best alternative would be planning for both 156 
peace keeping and training support in the near future with possible reductions in 157 
both as a mid-term target (a new alternate A4).  He is now under the impression 158 
a rapid withdrawal is feasible based on comments of others.  He then issued a 159 
second set of email questions requesting the team to identify the strengths and 160 
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weaknesses of A3 and A4, plus any additional issues for A1 and A2, and to rank 161 
order the alternatives.  COL Boomer also requested the team to address recent 162 
comments by Vice President Biden who stated the United States will not 163 
abandon Afghanistan. 164 
Comments Received 10 Nov 2011:         165 
Col Barnes, J2, stated no change in his recommendation for a rapid withdrawal 166 
(A1).  He insisted the prolonged use of U.S. military trainers in Afghanistan 167 
would not increase the effectiveness of the Afghan government. 168 
COL Custer, J3, further explained the rapid drawdown in Iraq allowed 169 
operations to be more effective and a similar result would be expected in 170 
Afghanistan.  Operations get results, and we need to focus on effectiveness of 171 
operations as the justification for A1. 172 
CAPT Parker, J4, explained his new proposal (A 3) would be far more 173 
sustainable from a logistics viewpoint although rapid withdrawal would be best 174 
to alleviate the overtaxed supply and logistics system that we have today.  He 175 
stated the Afghan logistics and infrastructure are not mature, but that he believed 176 
this was not a reason to delay withdrawal and that he could support A1 or A4. 177 
Col Chaney, J6, replied that each alternative has its merits but that A1 meets the 178 
Commanders intent and would still offer U.S. military in support to the Afghan 179 
government in the future if needed in order to satisfy Vice President Biden’s 180 
concerns.  She then stated A4 was the best fit for Commander intent and the 181 
Vice Presidents guidance. 182 
COL Sorensen, J7, stated a rapid drawdown with continuing operations to 183 
include a training mission (A4) may be feasible and would satisfy the statement 184 
by the Vice President. 185 
CAPT Swanson, J8, stated operations and logistics are key factors but she 186 
questioned if operations should drive the decision process or outweigh other 187 
factors.  Analysis by her staff indicates the Afghan government will fail without 188 
effective security from their police and military forces.  This will require 189 
continued training under A4 as the best option. 190 
COL Boomer, J5 group leader, again distributed electronically an anonymous 191 
summary of round 2 comments to identify key points of the second round.  COL 192 
Boomer noted the majority now seemed to favor immediate withdrawal with a 193 
training force to remain as the best alternative (A4).  He also acknowledge some 194 
members remained in firm support of A1 for total withdrawal.  The team was 195 
asked to comment again by email, with a new ranking of alternatives based on 196 
his summary, focusing on reaching a majority decision on a recommended 197 
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withdrawal schedule.  He encouraged each of them to revise or update their 198 
position based on the feedback summary he provided. 199 
Comments Received 11 Nov 2011: 200 
Col Barnes, J2, stated a long term withdrawal is not acceptable by today’s 201 
military planning doctrine as it is not the military’s role to conduct peace 202 
keeping or extensive training.  These are task the joint staff is trying to avoid, 203 
although training missions (A4) are acceptable under joint doctrine. 204 
COL Custer, J3, replied that he understood the desire for long term involvement 205 
in Afghanistan but that it just is not possible at the current levels.  Peace keeping 206 
is no longer an option as it was in previous wars.  The host nation must assume 207 
this role but not without United States support of one form or another, such as a 208 
training mission.  He can later propose a schedule for partial drawdown after 209 
consulting his chain of command and subordinate service components but at this 210 
time he remained in support of A1. 211 
CAPT Parker, J4, acknowledged a need for prolonged withdrawal to assist the 212 
Afghan government (A3/A4) but stated this is outweighed by the need to reduce 213 
forces and therefore A1 or A4 was the only acceptable solution. 214 
Col Chaney stated the J6 endorses the rapid withdrawal schedule (A1) due to 215 
demand for valuable U.S. communication assets to be used elsewhere.  She 216 
stated it is no longer possible to maintain communication networks for 217 
prolonged stays in a host nation. 218 
COL Sorensen, J7, stated his endorsement of the rapid withdrawal plus long 219 
term U.S. presence to allow time necessary for training (A4) the Afghan police 220 
who are not yet as effective as the Afghan military.  Peace keeping may need to 221 
be the role of the military until the police force is adequate. 222 
CAPT Swanson, J8, replied with a reminder that although the Afghan 223 
government wants the United States out of Afghanistan, there is a need for peace 224 
keeping and training (A3/A4) that exist over time to allow for maturing of the 225 
Afghan government.  This is the point Vice President Biden was making in his 226 
statement. 227 
12 Nov 2011 - Decision point: 228 
COL Boomer thanked the team for its input and feedback and stated they now 229 
seemed to have a majority opinion.  He informed them that he would review all 230 
the replies to the final round and use them in his analysis to identify the best 231 
alternative to present the Directors.  He asked each of the team members to 232 
standby for review and comment on his analysis prior to his submission to the 233 
Directors.  He now faced the task of performing a final analysis and selecting 234 
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the best alternative to present to the Directors for their endorsement to the 235 
Chairman.   236 
Discussion Notes: [GGPS] 237 
Key Issues: 10 Nov 2010 238 
COL Boomer, J5, opened the meeting with a quick summary of the task at hand 239 
and a reminder that the Directors, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, require 240 
a summary of the analysis and conclusions drawn by the group.  Col Barnes and 241 
COL Boomer will prepare the analysis and summary.  242 
COL Boomer stated he planned to follow the group problem solving model 243 
(GGPS) wherein there would be an opportunity for comments in an anonymous 244 
forum prior to a final decision to allow new proposals or ideas to be explored, as 245 
well as an opportunity to challenge decisions made previously.  Consultation 246 
with equivalent J5 staff officers at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and 247 
NATO, would allow input from major support organizations involved in 248 
execution of the withdrawal.  A final decision by the group would then be 249 
discussed.  His role is to guide the group toward consensus.  COL Boomer then 250 
opened discussions with a request for alternative proposals for review and 251 
analysis after he quickly listed the two basic alternatives of, A1) Rapid 252 
withdrawal), and A2) Prolonged withdrawal in the form of a peacekeeping 253 
force.  254 
CAPT Parker, J4, proposed what he termed an obvious compromise as a third 255 
alternative (A3) to have a longer withdrawal period, but with less United States 256 
involvement, short of peacekeeping forces we had in Europe or Korea.  257 
Remaining forces would have a training and support mission.  This would be far 258 
more sustainable from a logistics viewpoint although rapid withdrawal of most 259 
units would be best to alleviate a global supply chain that is overtaxed. 260 
Col Barnes, J2, endorsed the idea of a rapid withdrawal (A 1).  Intelligence 261 
reports indicate no known certainty of gaining increased security or a higher 262 
level of success from a prolonged withdrawal. 263 
COL Custer, J3, acknowledged the Afghan desire for United States withdrawal 264 
and recommended an immediate withdrawal similar to the operation in Iraq.  265 
Operations will also be far more effective with a drawdown in both Iraq and 266 
Afghanistan under A1.  267 
COL Sorensen, J7, voiced his concern that the Afghan military and police forces 268 
are not yet prepared to support the Afghan government’s control of the country, 269 
its borders, and security.  He endorsed A3 proposed by CAPT Parker for a 270 
gradual or prolonged withdrawal of the U.S. military training force. 271 
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CAPT Swanson, J8, presented her teams’ analysis of the Afghan government as 272 
unstable and the resulting recommendation for prolonged peace-keeping mission 273 
as well as training mission under the second alternative (A2/A3).   274 
COL Boomer, J5, stated his directorate believes the communication network is 275 
adequate, along with military strength projections, police force, and roadway 276 
construction to allow for a rapid withdrawal (A1). 277 
Col Chaney, J6, confirmed the communications network in Afghanistan is now 278 
stable based on existing infrastructure and future commitments from the World 279 
Bank for additional development.  A rapid withdrawal under A1 is possible. 280 
CAPT Parker, J4, agreed the road network in Afghanistan can be at desired 281 
levels in 2011, but stated the infrastructure for the police force is totally 282 
inadequate due to construction delays.  However, CAPT Parker did not believe 283 
this was a reason to delay withdrawal provided new construction progress in the 284 
rest of the country continued on schedule through 2014. 285 
Col Barnes, J2, and COL Custer, J3, both agreed the logistics are in place and 286 
will be adequate enough to allow, and support, a short-term rapid withdrawal 287 
from Afghanistan (A1).  288 
COL Sorenson, J7, and CAPT Swanson, J8, both disagreed and stated some sort 289 
of mid-term or perhaps even a prolonged withdrawal would be needed (A2/A3). 290 
COL Boomer, J5, then suggested the team break for two days time to allow him 291 
to coordinate the attendance of two officers with current hands-on experience in 292 
Afghanistan, COL Abrams, CENTCOM J5 Plans Chief, and Col. Westwood, 293 
NATO Operations & Planning Directorate who is currently assigned as a 294 
Liaison Officer at the Pentagon.  Both of these officers participated in the 295 
planning of the Iraq withdrawal and have many lessons learned to share.  The 296 
team members all agreed this would be beneficial. 297 
Key Issues: 12 Nov 2010 298 
COL Boomer introduced COL Abrams and Col. Westwood, as members of the 299 
previous Iraq scheduling team. 300 
COL Abrams and Col Westwood explained that a rapid or mid-term withdrawal 301 
for Iraq was termed acceptable due to the presence of a mature military, police, 302 
and government in place.  Even then, the short schedule for withdrawal and 303 
drawdown was very difficult to execute with significant challenges and therefore 304 
would not be preferred again if it is preventable.  However, they noted Vice 305 
President Biden recently stated the U.S. would not abandon Afghanistan.  306 
Afghanistan is known to be a much less mature environment than Iraq.  At this 307 
point, COL Westwood placed emphasis on the NATO forces inability to 308 
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maintain security in Afghanistan and train Afghan police forces after withdrawal 309 
of significant U.S. forces. 310 
CAPT Parker, J4, acknowledged that earlier he was trying to highlight some of 311 
the same issues for Afghan infrastructure that COL Abrams noted for Iraq, but 312 
that he (Abrams) had stated the needs much better than CAPT Parker could, and 313 
therefore he sees A3 as the only logical choice. 314 
COL Custer, J3, thanked Col Westwood for his, openness and being frank when 315 
sharing his insights.  COL Custer added that he may wish to discuss the NATO 316 
strength further with him during a break.  COL Custer then acknowledged the 317 
inevitable, although he was not in favor of it, it now appears to him that the 318 
logical approach is a rapid initial drawdown to some lesser degree, but that he 319 
would need to consult his senior staff in the J3 prior to endorsing such a plan. 320 
COL Sorensen, J7, stated his appreciation for the others now understanding the 321 
need for A3, and that he wanted to personally thank them for considering this 322 
alternative further. 323 
COL Boomer, J5, then thanked COL Abrams and Col Westwood for their 324 
insights and recommended the team break for lunch.  This would allow COL 325 
Abrams to return to CENTCOM for an afternoon strategy conference.  During 326 
this break, each member of the team owed him an email recommendation 327 
identifying the preferred alternative (A1, A2, or A3), plus an approximate 328 
timeline for the withdrawal schedule, and a brief justification for same.  Each of 329 
their recommendations would remain confidential.  At 1400 (2pm), the team 330 
would reconvene and COL Boomer would present a summary of the 331 
recommendations for further discussion toward achieving a consensus on the 332 
withdrawal schedule.  COL Boomer would make the final recommendation if 333 
consensus cannot be reached. 334 
Anonymous Email Comments Received by COL Boomer: 335 
Col Barnes, J2, stated he could now see that the others were learning toward 336 
alternative A3 for good reasons but the commander’s intent seemed clear, A1 is 337 
their only option. 338 
COL Custer, J3, stated a rapid and steady withdrawal of forces is required, but 339 
his directorate now understood the political significance of continuing a 340 
prolonged training mission.  He could now support either A1, or A3 proposed by 341 
CAPT Parker.  342 
CAPT Parker, J4, endorsed his proposed A3 alternative and provided a timeline 343 
for same. 344 
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Col Chaney, J6, stated A3 was tolerable and that she understood the need based 345 
on recent comments.  She also noted the J6 would withdraw U.S. 346 
communications equipment rapidly as the Afghan network is now coming on 347 
line, regardless of which alternative was selected.  This will allow CENTCOM 348 
and other commands to use the equipment in other locations. 349 
COL Sorensen, J7, summarized all the salient points supporting A3 as 350 
mentioned by the team and COL Abrams or Col Westwood.  He then proposed a 351 
schedule for the withdrawal and training mission (A3). 352 
CAPT Swanson, J8, stated she endorsed A3 as the team’s recommendation to 353 
the directors.  She also provided a proposed schedule that was very similar to the 354 
one provided by COL Sorensen.  355 
COL Boomer, J5, now believed he could prepare a general summary of the 356 
comments and bring the team to consensus at the 1400 Hr meeting.    357 
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Appendix D: Humanitarian Assistance Scenario 1 
SEEBRIG Scenario Introduction: [SAME FOR DELPHI AND GGPS] 2 
The South-Eastern European Brigade (SEEBRIG) exercise committee must 3 
decide the site for the Humanitarian Assistance (HA) project to be built as part 4 
of the Exercise Related Construction (ERC) during the annual exercise held in 5 
2012.  Two site locations are the primary candidates with emotions running high 6 
in favor of each.  The first site alternative (A1), is the nation’s capital city of 7 
Bucharest.  The second alternative (A2), is the city of Constanza on the Black 8 
Sea coastline.  The committee must select a site that benefits the local economy 9 
and serves the military’s needs based on the mission statement and commanders 10 
intent below. 11 
Mission Statement: 12 
Maintain lines of communications open and functioning smoothly among 13 
member countries by exercising SEEBRIG capabilities annually as a part of the 14 
Seven Stars exercise in 2012, the main SEEBRIG exercise of the year, to be 15 
performed in Constanza, Romania. 16 
Commander’s Intent: 17 
EUCOM shall assume the lead role in execution of the Seven Stars exercise to 18 
include planning, exercise related construction, humanitarian assistance (HA) 19 
construction incidental to the exercise, all operations during the exercise, and 20 
post exercise review and analysis for improved communications.   21 
Scenario Background: [SAME FOR DELPHI AND GGPS] 22 
The South-Eastern European Brigade (SEEBRIG) is a brigade size force (5000 23 
personnel), formed by seven nations in the Black Sea region.  The mission of the 24 
seven participating countries is to provide regional security and stability in the 25 
Euro-Atlantic area, and to open lines of communication and support for one-26 
another among the seven participants as envisioned in the principles of the 27 
United Nations (UN) Charter.  The seven participants are; Albania, Bulgaria, 28 
Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania, and Turkey.  The SEEBRIG organization 29 
has “observer countries” including the United States, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 30 
Slovenia, Croatia, and the Ukraine.  As the largest member, the United States is 31 
represented by the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and is expected to lead 32 
the annual training exercises. 33 
Past exercises have involved construction of various facilities for the local 34 
community such as the small schoolhouse constructed in the Constanza area of 35 
Romania in 2010.  The town of Constanza is located near a major training and 36 
125 
 
exercise facility in Romania, adjacent to the Black Sea.  The exercise brings 37 
many benefits to the local community in the form of economic stimulus for local 38 
vendors, hotels, and restaurants.  These benefits as well as local HA projects 39 
performed by the exercise forces are a form of compensation to the local 40 
community for any adverse impacts caused during the exercise. 41 
For the 2012 exercise, the HA project nominated by the city of Constanza is a 42 
small walk-in-type clinic to provide basic medical needs.  The Romanian 43 
military has proposed construction of this clinic in the perimeter area of the 44 
nation’s capital, Bucharest, six hours travel time from Constanza.  This proposal 45 
is heavily favored by the Romanian government and the U.S. Ambassador who 46 
desires access to the clinic for his embassy personnel.  The Romanian military 47 
insist the Bucharest location offers easy access for those exercise participants 48 
who travel to Constanza by entering Romania at the Bucharest airport.  They 49 
insist Bucharest has available housing, supplies, skilled labor, and dining 50 
facilities available to U.S. forces who will construct the HA project there.  51 
Typically, the HA projects are located near the exercise locations to allow 52 
participants to assist with construction of the HA project and to construct 53 
facilities in support of the exercise.  The distance from Bucharest to Constanza 54 
complicates the scheduling of construction in both locations by the same teams 55 
of construction experts.  The exercise committee must decide if Constanza or 56 
Bucharest will bring the greatest benefit to the host nation and the exercise 57 
participants. 58 
The group’s decision will be announced by the U.S. representative, the 59 
European Command (EUCOM) J4-Engineer assigned as the exercise related 60 
construction (ERC) coordinator for SEEBRIG.  As lead for construction, the J4-61 
Engineer participant is responsible to validate the project location, availability of 62 
construction resources, and effectiveness of construction operations. 63 
Several decision-making methods were proposed to guide the exercise 64 
committee in this decision.  Transcripts of the decision-making discussion 65 
leading to selection of the HA site and the “official” summary of the decision-66 
making process utilized by the SEEBRIG participants are provided for your 67 
review.  Please read these documents and answer the questions that follow. 68 
SEEBRIG Transcript Minutes:  69 
[DELPHI INTRODUCTION] 70 
Due to the extensive travel requirements to hold face-to-face meetings, the team 71 
conducted a series of discussions by electronic questionnaire, and email.  CDR 72 
Evans, the U.S. lead representative from the EUCOM J4-Engineer staff, opened 73 
the discussions with an email summary of the issue to be decided (site selection 74 
of the clinic), and a short summary of discussion points for recommended site 75 
alternatives and reasons for selecting the site.  He explained the discussions and 76 
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final site selection would be made using the Delphi technique wherein all 77 
comments would be anonymous and made via e-mail.  A team of subject matter 78 
experts (country representatives) would be surveyed by email for their input 79 
during multiple rounds with feedback provided at the beginning of the 80 
subsequent round until the team reaches consensus.  Thus, the group can 81 
respond at their convenience while avoiding the need for travel.  CDR Evans 82 
would then summarize comments for the team and ask them for a second round 83 
of comments on the first round of feedback by others and how best to improve 84 
the decision or majority view presented in the previous round of comments. 85 
The second round included comments on previous comments and questioning of 86 
intent in previous feedback.  A final round of comments was collected for 87 
consideration prior to drafting a final decision paper by CDR Evans who is 88 
responsible for approving funding for the clinic and overseeing construction.  89 
The discussions were conducted September 8th, 13th, and 16th of 2010.  90 
Significant comments and nominations are described below. 91 
[GGPS INTRODUCTION ] 92 
The meeting was called by the EUCOM J4 – Engineer lead officer, CDR Evans.  93 
The meeting was held at the Ataturk War Gaming Center, SEEBRIG 94 
Headquarters, Istanbul, Turkey on 8 Sep 2010, at 0800 hr.  Discussion lasted 95 
several hours with key decision points and comments captured in the notes 96 
below. 97 
Attendees: [SAME FOR DELPHI AND GGPS] 98 
CDR. Ralph Evans, U.S. EUCOM J4-E 99 
Col. Vlad Kilkis, Bulgaria 100 
Col. Petre Zyler, Ukraine 101 
Col. Anal Cerzy, Turkey 102 
Col. Mirko Romosa, Romania 103 
Col. Peter Korlu, Albania 104 
Col. Caesar Sedano, Italy 105 
Col. Anthony Manas, Greece 106 
Key Discussion Points: [DELPHI] 107 
CDR Evans, EUCOM, in a conference call to all team members on 8 Sep 2010, 108 
opened the discussions by providing background of the humanitarian assistance 109 
project criteria previously approved by the exercise committee members.  The 110 
team objective is to decide the location of the clinic in coordination with need 111 
for support to the upcoming exercise in Romania next year.  He reminded the 112 
team that the original SEEBRIG charter for the exercise specified any related 113 
HA projects would also be located in the local community sponsoring the 114 
exercise; in this case, Constanza would be the local community.  He also noted 115 
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that each member of the team was designated as the exercise subject matter 116 
expert for the nation they represent and that he expected constructive comments 117 
to be forthcoming on the location of the clinic in response to his questionnaire. 118 
Responses to Questionnaire Received 8 Sep 2010: 119 
Col Romosa, the Romanian team member, replied first with comments.  He 120 
stated his countrymen had put a great deal of effort into deciding the location of 121 
the clinic and it was decided at the highest level for the clinic to be located in 122 
Bucharest, the capital.   123 
Col Kilkis, Bulgaria, sent comments indicating his government has consulted 124 
with the Romanians and agreed to locate the clinic in Bucharest (A1). 125 
Col Zyler, Ukraine, provided an endorsement of the Bucharest (A1) location 126 
with no reasoning provided. 127 
Col Sedano, Italy, stated a preference for the clinic to be located in Constanza 128 
(A2) to serve the soldiers who attend the exercise.   129 
Col Manas, Greece, also commented the location should be in Constanza (A2) 130 
as his soldiers will be involved in construction and have easy access to the port 131 
of Constanza, but not Bucharest. 132 
Col Korlu, Albania, stated he believed the clinic should be located in Constanza 133 
(A2) since he was aware of a larger medical facility already existing at the 134 
international airport in Bucharest.   135 
Col Cerzy, Turkey, stated no preference for the clinic and that he did not see a 136 
need for a clinic to support the exercise. 137 
CDR Evans, EUCOM, prepared a summary of all comments and distributed 138 
them to the team without identifying who had made the comments.  He noted 139 
the group was equally split on the two locations, Bucharest (A1), and Constanza 140 
(A2).  He made note of the existing clinic at the Bucharest airport.  He also 141 
included anonymously the requirement for the HA construction to allow more 142 
practice using local construction techniques in this area where the exercise is 143 
held.  This allows HA and exercise construction to be done by the same work 144 
force.  He distributed his summary to members and requested they revise or 145 
update their own comments after reviewing the comments of others.  Replies 146 
with rank ordering of alternatives were due 13 Sep 2010. 147 
Comments received 13 Sep 2010: 148 
Col Romosa, Romania, explained his government viewed this sort of self-149 
serving request for a clinic in Constanza as undesirable.  He acknowledged that 150 
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Bucharest already has a large hospital at the airport, yet he added that Constanza 151 
also has a mid-sized hospital as well.  Surely, everyone can understand the 152 
greater good a clinic can provide the masses in Bucharest (A1). 153 
Col Kilkis, Bulgaria, noted the Bucharest location (A1) best serves the 154 
Romanians and Bulgarians.  The Bulgarian residents in the remote northern 155 
region of Ruse will be able to use the clinic.  The clinic location is also 156 
convenient to the U.S. Embassy staff in Bucharest. 157 
Col Zyler, Ukraine, emphasized the HA project is to benefit the citizens of the 158 
host nation and is therefore not intended to be a part of the exercise (implying 159 
Bucharest is acceptable, A1).  Surely, none of the schoolhouses built as a part of 160 
recent exercises would be used by the military in an exercise. 161 
Col Sedano, Italy, now voiced a desire for the clinic to be in Constanza (A2) to 162 
allow sharing of construction resources. 163 
Col Manas, Greece, acknowledged the clinic could be located where host nation 164 
needs dictate, but the Constanza (A2) site has as much need as Bucharest.  He 165 
also noted that construction by his soldiers in Bucharest would create a hardship 166 
and burden of increased travel and billeting cost.  He asked who would pay this 167 
cost. 168 
Col Korlu, Albania, stated both locations appear to be valid.  He explained the 169 
same benefits would result from either location.  He could now accept the 170 
Bucharest (A1) location for the clinic.  He also noted the Constanza locations 171 
would allow stabilization of patients in an emergency, including any participants 172 
injured during the exercise, prior to transport to a hospital and thought the 173 
Constanza location should be discussed further.  174 
Col Cerzy, Turkey, stated the clinic is for the host nation use and it should be 175 
located in Bucharest (A2). 176 
CDR Evans, EUCOM, then distributed a summary email condensing these 177 
comments for the team to review and comment upon once again.  He also 178 
included a reminder from the SEEBRIG charter indicating the HA project is in 179 
fact intended to benefit the exercise team if possible.  He also emphasized the 180 
fact that neither Romania nor the U.S. governments had any additional funding 181 
available to cover the additional cost of building the clinic in Bucharest.  He 182 
reminded them to revise their previous positions in light of the new comments 183 
and to reply prior to 16 Sep 2010. 184 
Comments Received 16 Sep 2010: 185 
Col Romosa, Romania, stated the exercise will use the clinic for a very short 186 
duration, and more use will be made of the location in Bucharest (A1) and thus 187 
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the additional cost was justified.  He was sure the United States could find 188 
additional funding.  He concluded everyone would be able to see the logic and 189 
justification for Bucharest if they had met in Bucharest to discuss the decision 190 
instead of using email discussion techniques. 191 
Col Kilkis, Bulgaria, added a comment suggesting the team put the selection to a 192 
vote instead of CDR Evans preparing a final decision paper based on the team’s 193 
discussions.  He also admitted that he was not sure Bulgarian citizens would use 194 
the clinic in Bucharest.  He also stated Bulgaria could not cover the additional 195 
cost of building a clinic in Bucharest and therefore he was open to the Constanza 196 
(A2) location. 197 
Col Zyler, Ukraine, commented to remind everyone that both the United States 198 
and Ukraine are advisor nations and not members of SEEBRIG.  Therefore he 199 
suggested the SEEBRIG nations decide without United States or Ukraine 200 
involvement and it will become clear that the Bucharest (A1) location is the best 201 
location. 202 
Col Sedano, Italy, stated Italy could not cover the additional cost of construction 203 
in Bucharest and that leaves no choice other than to build the clinic in Constanza 204 
(A2) 205 
Col Manas, Greece, reaffirmed his position that Constanza (A2) should be the 206 
location of the clinic as it was the location chosen for the exercises and therefore 207 
was the only location the budget would accommodate.  208 
Col Korlu, Albania, claimed he must change his position back to Constanza 209 
(A2) based on funding, but that he thought it was a shame funding alone was 210 
driving the decision. 211 
Col Cerzy, Turkey, stated he agreed with the Bucharest location (A1), but that 212 
his service members would enter Romania in the port of Constanza and could 213 
not participate in HA construction due to cost. 214 
Decision Report: 215 
CDR Evans collected all final comments and verified the U.S. budget could not 216 
be increased.  After review of the comments, he informed the team that they 217 
now appeared to have a majority opinion and that he could now prepare a final 218 
decision report for the team and the SEEBRIG command to approve.  219 
Key Discussion Points: [GGPS] 220 
CDR Evans opened the discussions by explaining the need to agree on a location 221 
site for the humanitarian assistance (HA) project for the 2012 exercise.  He then 222 
provided a summary of the HA project criteria previously approved by the 223 
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exercise committee members.  The project shall be a small walk-in health clinic 224 
provided with standard emergency first aid equipment. 225 
CDR Evans stated the objective behind the location is to assist the locals living 226 
in the area of the exercise and to benefit from the service members as resources 227 
sent to the exercise in Constanza, Romania next year.  He identified the two 228 
alternative locations as Bucharest (A1), Constanza (A2).  He agreed to allow 229 
additional locations to be nominated during discussions. 230 
CDR Evans announced the team had available for consult, two colleagues 231 
involved with the planning of the past 2010 SEEBRIG exercise in Constanza.  232 
He would like to involve the two at various times during the discussion period.  233 
CDR Evans stated that he would facilitate the discussion and that he intended to 234 
follow a group problem solving model (GGPS) that would include an 235 
opportunity for anonymous comments and recommendations prior to a final 236 
decision.  The team will begin discussions with a brainstorming session to 237 
identify strengths and weaknesses of the two locations, followed by 238 
recommendations or endorsements of one of the sites preferred by each member. 239 
 He briefly explained there would be one or two rounds of discussion followed 240 
by consult with the two colleagues.  Then, a final decision-making discussion 241 
would be held after CDR Evans received anonymous feedback from each of the 242 
members recommending the site they preferred.  CDR Evans would summarize 243 
for the group the anonymous comments for their discussion prior to making the 244 
final decision.  The team members agreed to follow this procedure and CDR 245 
Evans opened the floor for discussion. 246 
Col Romosa asked that he be allowed to add to the summary and explained his 247 
countrymen had put a great deal of effort into deciding the location of the clinic 248 
and it was decided at the highest levels to build the clinic in Bucharest, the 249 
capitol (A1), where it can serve more Romanian citizens.  250 
CDR Evans thanked Col Romosa for his remarks and then obtained agreement 251 
to begin the discussions.  He asked if anyone had an alternative location to the 252 
two proposed locations.  The group was in agreement that these were the only 253 
two logical locations based on availability of resources for construction and ease 254 
of access to the sites selected.  255 
Col Kilkis, Bulgaria, then noted his government supports the Bucharest (A1) 256 
location due to proximity to Bulgaria and the future potential for Bulgarians 257 
residing in the remote region of Ruse to seek medical attention in nearby 258 
Bucharest.   259 
Col Zyler, Ukraine, endorsed the planned site of Bucharest (A1) as proposed by 260 
the Romanians and Bulgarians.  261 
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Col Kilkis, Bulgaria, agreed enthusiastically and stated everyone should 262 
understand the Bucharest clinic would be located on the south end of the city, 263 
convenient to the U.S. Embassy staff and the Bulgarian citizens in Ruse.  264 
Col Zyler, Ukraine, concurred and asked CDR Evans if he or any of the others 265 
opposed this location. 266 
At that time, Col Sedano, Italy, and Col Manas, Greece, both stated their 267 
preference for the clinic to be in Constanza (A2) to serve their soldiers who will 268 
attend the exercise next year. 269 
Col Korlu, Albania, believes the clinic should be located in Constanza (A2) 270 
since he was aware of a larger medical facility already existing at the 271 
international airport in Bucharest.   272 
CDR Evans asked Col Cerzy, Turkey, what his preference was but Col Cerzy 273 
stated either location was acceptable. 274 
CDR Evans then read an excerpt from the SEEBRIG charter indicating 275 
associated HA projects should benefit both the local citizens and the exercise 276 
team if possible.  He then sated that he understood why this decision raised 277 
strong feelings in support of both locations.  At this point, he thought it best to 278 
bring in the two consultants for discussion.  The group members agreed. 279 
After a break, COL Johnson, EUCOM J5 liaison to the Ataturk War Game 280 
Center, and his colleague, Col Erturk, Ataturk War Game Center, both of whom 281 
participated in the planning of the 2010 exercise, joined the group discussion 282 
after being provided a brief summary of the discussion above.  The two colonels 283 
were in agreement on location of the HA project, that is, that it was not required 284 
to be located in the proximity of the exercise although another more distant 285 
location would be highly unusual.  COL Johnson pointed out the efficiency 286 
gained by the HA and exercise projects both being in Constanza, is lost if the 287 
HA project is in Bucharest.   288 
Col Romosa, Romania, asked COL Johnson to explain why the efficiency would 289 
be reduced with the Bucharest location and if cost was a factor. 290 
COL Johnson explained by having the two projects close to one another, the 291 
construction crews could alternate between the two sites based on the trade skill, 292 
such as carpentry or roofers, when needed.  This avoids lost time for the one 293 
trade to be waiting on the other.  The first crews could prepare one site and then 294 
move to the other.  A second crew would then follow the first and each would 295 
remain busy during their time on site. Everyone should understand that the HA 296 
project cost is more reasonable when the project is close to the exercise and can 297 
share resources.  298 
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Col Erturk explained the budget will be the ultimate decision factor.  He 299 
explained that the budget was barely enough in 2010 when the HA project was 300 
located in Constanza. 301 
Col Korlu, Albania, stated he understood how the cost would be more if the HA 302 
project was in Bucharest.  He realized the time for travel between the two sites 303 
by the construction crews would be lost time that would have to be paid for out 304 
of the budget.  He asked if anyone still believed the project should be in 305 
Bucharest instead of Constanza (A2). 306 
Col Kilkis, Bulgaria stated the Bucharest (A1) site may be more costly but it 307 
was justified due to political reasons. 308 
Both COL Johnson and Col Erturk, War College staff members, stated there are 309 
many political reasons for having the clinic on the south of Bucharest.  310 
However, many political factors were considered in the original SEEBRIG 311 
exercise charter calling for the HA project to be in the same town as the 312 
exercise.  Of course, cost is another factor that can become political if the host 313 
nation can contribute to the project.  If no host nation funds are available, then it 314 
is up to the team to decide if the political needs in this situation dictate the HA 315 
project location and if this can be done for the approved budget amount.  No 316 
further discussions with COL Johnson or Col Erturk were held. 317 
Col Romosa, Romania, waited for the two War College staff members to leave 318 
before he opened the second round of discussions by stating there is a great 319 
amount of political pressure to have the clinic located in Bucharest.  The 320 
exercise will use the clinic for a very short duration and Constanza also has an 321 
existing hospital.  Bucharest (A1) will get more use from the clinic and Romania 322 
should not be required to pay any additional cost.  323 
COL Kilkis, Bulgaria, stated the Bucharest (A1) location will also serve the 324 
exercise participants as anyone associated with the exercise will be able to use 325 
the clinic on their transit out of Romania via the airport in Bucharest. 326 
Col Korlu, Albania, stated the clinic in Constanza (A2) would allow 327 
stabilization of patients in an emergency prior to transport to the Bucharest 328 
airport hospital prior to transport by plane. 329 
Col Cerzy stated he saw merit to both locations and still had no preference. 330 
Col Manas, Greece, stated his preference for Constanza (A2) due to the close 331 
proximity to the exercise.  He can pay the cost for his soldiers to work on both 332 
the clinic and barracks needed at the Constanza exercise site.  He also stated that 333 
his crews do not enter Romania through Bucharest and to do so is an additional 334 
cost.   335 
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Col Romosa explained his government viewed this sort of self-serving as 336 
undesirable and had overruled the local government interest of Constanza for the 337 
very same type of self interest.  338 
Col Sedano, Italy, at that time relented and stated he could see merit in both 339 
locations while the Constanza location has short term merit that may not in fact 340 
ever be needed or used by exercise participants. 341 
CDR Evans asked for the members to respect the position of each other and 342 
remain open to discussion points.  He stated that he also sees merit in the 343 
Constanza location for the experience gained through work with local Constanza 344 
contractors who will support future exercises. 345 
Col Zyler, Ukraine, stated Bucharest (A1) must be able to serve the same 346 
purpose of the Constanza location, surely none of the schoolhouses built as a 347 
part of recent exercises would be used by the military in an exercise.  348 
Col Romosa responded by explaining that if the meeting had been held in 349 
Bucharest, surely everyone, and not just he and Col Kilkis, and Col Zyler, would 350 
see the logic and justification for Bucharest to receive the clinic.  351 
CDR Evans explained the meeting was held in Istanbul for two reasons, first it is 352 
the location of SEEBRIG headquarters and second, the clinic topic had become 353 
heated and emotional in the previous meeting, therefore a neutral meeting 354 
location was selected.   355 
CDR Evans then called for a recess over lunch to be followed by a short 356 
decision meeting this afternoon at 1400 hr (2pm).  He requested each 357 
representative use the computer terminals in the center during lunch break to 358 
email him their recommendation as to the final location of the HA project and 359 
their reason for same.  Their comments would remain anonymous.  At the 360 
meeting he would provide an overview of the anonymous site recommendations 361 
and ask the team if they could agree on a final location based on those 362 
comments.  If no agreement could be reached, he would ask for a silent vote 363 
where each member would remain anonymous, and that he would announce the 364 
final decision.  365 
The anonymous emails CDR Evans received were very short and concise.  In 366 
them, Col Romosa, Romania, and Col Zyler, Ukraine stated their preference for 367 
Bucharest (A1) with the United States paying any additional cost.  Col Sedano, 368 
Italy, Col Manas, Greece, and Col Korlu, Albania stated their preferences for 369 
Constanza (A2).  Col Cerzy stated he could accept either location but that 370 
Constanza (A2) was in fact more convenient for Turkey.  Col Kilkis stated that 371 
he could not be sure if Bulgarians would in fact use a clinic in Bucharest, or if 372 
they would be allowed, and that he could accept the Constanza (C2) site. 373 
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CDR Evans called the afternoon meeting to order and presented a summary to 374 
highlight the fact that some nations do not enter Romania through Bucharest and 375 
their cost would be higher for the HA project to be built there.  Also, he 376 
summarized the funding situation by stating although it was suggested the 377 
United States pay additional cost, the United States could not agree to do so and 378 
the budget would remain unchanged.  He opened the floor to further discussions 379 
and reminded the team if no decision was reached, that he would hold an 380 
anonymous vote. 381 
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Appendix E: List of Abbreviations 
 
A1 – Scenario Alternative No.l, A2 – Alternative No.2, etc. 
ABC – American Broadcasting Network 
AF - Afghanistan 
Afghan – Afghanistan 
BBC – British Broadcasting Network 
CAPT – Navy Officer Equivalent to Army/Air Force/Marine rank of Colonel 
CDR – Navy Officer Equivalent to Army/Air Force/Marine rank of Lt. Col. 
CENTCOM – U.S. Central Command 
CEO – Chief Executive Officer 
CGPS – Continuous Group Problem Solving 
Ch - Chief 
CMU – Carnegie Mellon University 
CNN – Cable News Network 
COA – Course of Action 
Col/COL – Colonel 
Comm - Communications 
DA – Department of the Army 
DoD – Department of Defense 
DMps – Strengths of the Decision-Making Model 
DMng – Weaknesses of the Decision-Making Model 
DMused – Decision-Making Model Used at Participants Home Organization 
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ERC – Exercise Related Construction 
EUCOM – U.S. European Command 
FM – Field Manual 
FtF - Face-to-Face 
GGPS – General Group Problem Solving 
GS – General Schedule 
HA – Humanitarian Assistance 
HDMID – How Decision Model Improves Decisions 
HN – Host Nation 
IC – Inner-Circle 
Intel - Intelligence 
IRB – Institutional Review Board 
J2 – Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate, J3 Ops, J4 Log, J5 Plans, J6 Comm, J7 
Training, and J8 Resources 
JS – Joint Staff 
Log - Logistics 
Lt. Col. – Lieutenant Colonel 
MDMP – Military Decision-Making Process 
MSU – Michigan State University 
N – Number of Participants or Sample Size 
NATO – North American Treaty Organization 
NC – Norman Campus 
NGT – Nominal Group Technique 
137 
 
OSD – Office, Secretary of Defense 
OU – Oklahoma University 
O1 - Section of Questionnaire Completed, O2, O3, etc. 
Ops – Operations 
PAge – Participants Age 
PEdLvl – Participant Education Level 
PGndr – Participant Gender 
PImpr – Participant Recommended Improvement ( to PpreDM) 
PMilBr – Participants Military Branch of Service 
PosDes – Participants Job Title or Position Description 
PpreDM – Participant Preferred Decision-Making Model 
PRace – Participants Race 
PRank – Participants Military Rank or Civilian Grade 
R1 – Random Assignment of Participant Group, R2, R3, etc. 
Res – Resources 
s – Standard Deviation 
SEEBRIG - South-Eastern European Brigade 
SME – Subject Matter Expert 
Tinf – Team Member of High Influence 
Trng - Training 
TSLP – Team Solution Participant Anticipated the Team Would Make 
TSol – Team Solution 
UN – United Nations 
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U.S. – United States 
WhoDM – Team Members at Participants Office Involved in Decision-Making 
WWII – Second World War 
www – World Wide Web 
X – Independent Variable 
Y – Dependent Variable 
YPpre – Reason Participant Preferred (Decision-Making Model) 
YrsSrv – Years of Military or Government Service 
YTSL – Reason Team Selected Alternative 
YTSLP – Reason Participant Anticipated Team Decision is Better Than TSLP 
YuseDM – Reason for Participants Home Organization to Select DMused 
z – Desired Accuracy in Statistical Analysis 
 
